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Abstract
This research discusses the characteristics that make projects difficult to manage. Project
inefficiencies and failures can be attributed to the structure of a system. Developing a
measurement for complexity based on the number and nature of interactions in the system can
allow project complexity to be reduced while still meeting project objectives. Previous research
has identified characteristics or markers of complex systems but does not address how to
measure or how to reduce a system’s complexity.
The objective of this dissertation is to develop a metric for complexity that assists project and
emergency managers in reducing project complexity either by engineering complexity out, if
possible, in the planning stage, or by managing the system during an ad hoc incident. The
proposed measure uses the number of interactions for a given perspective of the system as the
metric of complexity and uses disequilibrium from the expected normal state as an indicator of
an irreducible interaction and an indicator of complexity. The proposed hypothesis is discussed
through mathematical and visual examples to illustrate disequilibrium in system interactions.
The methodology is demonstrated in three case studies: one in construction, through the Morgan
Street Bridge project over the Rock River in Rockford, Illinois; and two in emergency response
incidents (one local and one State/Federal). These cases demonstrate how this measure of
complexity can be used to reduce complexity in a project by identifying the perspective of interest
in the system, determining the disequilibrium in the interactions, and reducing the interactions
while minimizing information loss.

viii

1 Introduction
1.1 Problem Statement
Project management, which includes emergency response, is fundamentally the management of
a system of resources to accomplish project objectives (ICCPM 2012). Failures of project
management reduce efficiency, increase cost, and can prevent the project objectives from being
met (Jordan et al. 2016). Nationally, regionally, and locally, there is interest from emergency
managers, responders, and elected officials to understand why communications continue to be a
problem, especially given the large sums of money routinely allocated to improving
communications and information flow (Comfort et al. 2004; Manoj et al. 2007). Therefore, the
emphasis of this research is to explore the issues of information flow failures in project
management - emergency response in particular. The question this research attempts to answer
is: What specific characteristics make projects difficult to manage?
Project management has traditionally used methods that assume projects to be static, with fixed
material quantities, and predictable timetables (ICCPM 2012). Variations to these assumptions
are accounted for by incorporating contingency factors based on statistical characterization of
specific variables related to cost and schedule. However, if the conditions of the project vary
beyond this contingency envelop, projects begin to run “over budget” and “behind schedule”
despite the best efforts of traditional project management. More recently, the complexity of
projects has been recognized as the causal factor behind project management failures (ICCPM
2012), (Vidal et al. 2011). Vidal et al. (2011) states that “ever growing project complexity is an
ever-growing source of project risks”. The International Centre for Complex Project Management
Standards (2012) classify projects as complex if the project is: emergent, adaptive with sensitivity
to initial conditions, and contains feedback loops (ICCPM 2012); characteristics that are also
supported by Remington and Pollack (2007) in their study of system complexity. It has been
suggested that a pathway to improving efficiency, and reducing delays in project management, is
to assess and address the challenges presented by complexity of projects (Owens et al. 2012;
(ICCPM 2012).
Emergency management is a subset of project management. In the United States, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) recognized the impact of poor project (or incident)
management in the 1970’s and began to put in place an organizational structure (called the
Incident Command System (ICS) when it was finally implemented by the Homeland Security Act
of 2002 (Nicholson et al. 2006)) to standardize emergency response in the United States (Bigley
and Roberts 2001). One of the initial concerns was the ability for a standardized organizational
structure to scale possessing the ability to work for incidents as small as a single car traffic stop
all the way up to a hurricane response (Favero 1999). However, there continue to be failures even
with this standardized Incident Command System in place. After Action Reports (AAR), emergency
management practitioners, and the literature (Grinter et al. 1999) frequently identify information
flow failures as a source of incident response inefficiency (Comfort et al. 2009; Federal Emergency
Management Agency 2018a; Richardson and Byers 2006).
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Few failure modes of emergency response information flow have been identified (Manoj et al.
2007) and modern crisis are becoming more complex (Weick et al. 2008). However, literature
reveals some clues as to where information flow failures have occurred. The work by Comfort et
al. (2004) identified how the amount and type of information provided to responders impacts the
emergency response efficiency. Comfort et al. (2004) also examines the structure of the response.
Specifically, local jurisdictions respond more efficiently on their own, rather than in a centralized
(state-wide for example) controlled system. However, the study did not examine the integrated
response framework of ICS and the information flow through its structure, but rather a non-ICS
structure. Another study by Jensen and Jr., Waugh (2014) suggests the ICS framework is not useful
as an all-hazards framework but only in ‘routine’ or ‘practiced’ emergencies where responders
already understood the structure of the response, suggesting that the structure of the response
impacts the information flow. This result also indicates that when an incident is not a normal
incident or does not progress as expected, there are information flow issues. Moynihan (2009)
identifies a number of issues with the ICS framework’s structure that are actually information flow
issues. But the previous works do not identify the intersections between the information flow
failure types with incident hazard type and size. Nor do these works directly address the issue of
emergency response complexity, but they do discuss issues that are characteristics of complex
systems. The conjecture is that the causes of information flow failure identified in the literature
are actually indications of complex systems.

1.2 Objective
The objective of this research is to determine a measure of complexity and system characteristics
that identify information flow failure in project management. This will determine the impact of
system complexity on information flow. The result of this research will be a metric to assess
complexity of systems and the likely points of failure. Emergency managers, responders, and
project managers can apply this metric to engineer out or reduce the frequency and mitigate the
impacts of information flow failures.
Previous works have examined various parts of complex systems and the emergency response
process. Emergency response and recovery is a process involving many agencies, resources, and
levels of government that must communicate to be successful and efficient (Jordan and JavernickWill 2013). Hence, the questions motivating this research are:
•
•
•

System Complexity: What are complex system characteristics? How is complexity
defined? How is complexity measured?
ICS Structure: What is the structure? Are there known problems with the structure? How
does ICS scale?
Information flow: What information flow problems does ICS have? Does information flow
scale as ICS scales? How does scaling change the information flow?

This dissertation specifically examines the case of information flow failures between components
of a system through the lens of complexity.
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1.3 Contributions and Expected Outcomes
The contributions of this dissertation are the methods to identify the ways complexity is impacting
projects in an objective way, in contrast to existing methods that are superficial and based on
categorization. The development of a metric for complexity will contribute to identifying
information flow failure points in project management and emergency response. Managers and
coordinators can use this information to design their plans to limit the factors that negatively
impact the information flow.
The expected outcomes of this research are:
•
•

A method of measuring complexity
Methods to identify disequilibrium in systems

These outcomes will allow managers to reduce the information flow failure potential of their
projects.

1.4 Organization
The problem driving this dissertation is project management failure - why are failures occurring?
The hypothesis is that project management failures are occurring due to the structure of the
project system, specifically number and nature of the interactions between the components of
the system. In order to test this hypothesis, a metric is needed to measure the complexity of a
system.
This dissertation is organized into the following chapters:
Chapter 1 discusses the motivation in determining a metric for complex systems, states
the objectives, and outlines the expected outcomes.
Chapter 2 discusses the background in complexity and reviews the literature of complex
systems, disequilibrium, and discusses previous work to measure complexity. The points
of departure from the literature are discussed leading to the proposed measure of
complexity.
Chapter 3 investigates the number and nature of complex systems through a discussion
of visualization and analysis methods. These methods include graphical representation of
systems (project), mathematical representations, and then examines these
representations using signal processing techniques to try and reveal the underlying
structure of the system.
Chapter 4 applies the methods from chapter 3 in case studies. Three case studies are used
(one in construction, two in emergency management) to show how the measure of
complexity and the visualizations developed in Chapter 3 can be used to measure
complexity, determine the disequilibrium in an interaction, and how complexity of the
system can be reduced.
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Chapter 5 discusses the conclusions of this dissertation, discuss the limitations, and
makes recommendations for future research.
Next, this dissertation will review the literature and determine the points of departure for this
research.
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2 Background
2.1 Definitions
This dissertation will address systems, project management, complexity, and information flow.
While the definitions of these terms vary throughout the literature, this dissertation will use the
following definitions for consistency:
Systems are defined as individual components connected together to function as a single unit.
These connections are the internal interactions of the system. Systems can be permanently
connected together or can be formed ad hoc. The whole system can be altered by changing out
one component (ICCPM 2012).
Project management is defined as the organization and coordination of resources to accomplish
a set of agreed upon objectives (either contractual or goal driven). Emergency response is a subset
of project management because it also requires coordination and assignment of resources to form
a system to accomplish objectives (ICCPM 2012).
Information is defined as a combination of data and content (Monge et al. 2003).
Information flow is defined as the movement of a specific volume, content, or frequency of
information between components of the system within a given time period (Matisziw et al. 2008).
However, unlike a tangible object, the movement of information does not remove it from a
previous location (Leonidas 2011).
Information flow failures occur when the information is not completing the path between two
components of the system. The failures are occurring at the information exchange points where
two parts of a system are connected - i.e. the interactions in the structure of the system. Zachary
(1977) also describes an information flow failure as a “bottleneck” or structural limitation.
A channel is the path information flow takes. This could be in the form of voice traffic or electronic
information (such as an email) (Zachary 1977).
It is also important to note the differences between project operation, organization, and
management.
Project operation refers to the cyclic tasks to accomplish project objectives or sub-objectives.
Project organization refers to the system that defines the relationships between the components.
Project management is defined by (Munns and Bjeirmi 1996) as directing tasks and resources to
accomplish the project objectives.
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2.2 Defining Complexity
Monge et al. (2003) discuss complexity in communication networks through a review of
complexity and modeling research. Monge et al. (2003) describe the components of complex
systems as a network of agents, agent attributes and traits, rules for agent interactions, and the
structure that results from the agent rules and interactions. Describing complex systems as a
network of entities, Brook (2016) and Monge et al. (2003) also includes the topological
relationships between agents in the network impacting how agents transfer information between
each other. Holden et al. (2013) agree with the importance of complex network topology but look
at it from a resilience to disruption perspective. However, the number of relationships
(connections) is not discussed further in these works. In similar work, Provan and Kenis (2008)
discuss governance (control and organizational) for complex networks but do not clearly define
what “complex” means. In addition to traits like experience and expertise (among others), three
categories of traits by Axelrod et al. (1999), location, capabilities, and memory, are discussed. Key
among these is memory, which includes past experiences, known contacts, and where agents can
get information. Manson (2001) notes that the linking between components in a complex system
allows them to accommodate a wide range of situations, in part, due to this memory
characteristic, and Phelan (1999) states that agents learn from their own localized experiences.
From a project management and emergency response perspective, the memory trait is important
for an efficient response and forms the basis of why responders participate in training and
exercises - to build that memory and experience set, when real events may be infrequent (Federal
Emergency Management Agency 2020). The rules governing interactions prescribe how an agent
interacts with others (Little 2003; Monge et al. 2003). These rules are not necessarily static and
Monge et al. (2003) even proposes that they are not rules but meta rules, where agents choose
to follow or change the rules depending on the circumstances. Similar comments have been made
by Gideon et al. (2005) about components following rules and practices laid out by management
in order to become part of the larger system. Stochastic behavior of agents, such as deciding to
follow rules or not, is beyond the scope of this research. This research will focus instead on events
with a predetermined structure such as the incident command system (ICS), due to the
requirement for emergency response to follow the ICS structure per Federal Emergency
Management guidelines. However, it is noted in literature (Moynihan (2009) and (Bennet 2011)
for example) that responders do not always adhere to this requirement.
Crutchfield and Young (1989) define simplicity of a system as the ability to mathematically reduce
its behavior without information loss. In their definition, simplicity does not vary linearly with the
level of information content in the system. Systems that exhibit periodic behavior are considered
to be just as simple as systems that exhibit truly random behavior because in both cases the
systems can be mathematically represented using periodic and stochastic equations, respectively,
and therefore can be reduced without any information loss. Hence, for both periodic and
stochastic systems the information content is considered to be low, while the information content
is considered to be higher for systems exhibiting not truly random behavior. Hence, their
definition of complexity is a measure of the inability to reduce a system mathematically without
loss of information. Such complex systems tend to be in between the extremes of periodic
systems and systems that exhibit true random behavior, because they cannot be mathematically
reduced without information loss using either periodic or stochastic equations. These systems are
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often considered to be chaotic and of medium information content. Formally, Crutchfield and
Young (1989) define complexity as:
“The … approach is an abstract notion of complexity: the information contained in the
minimum number of equivalence classes obtained by reducing a data set modulo a
symmetry.”
“The equivalence classes” represent the reducible information in the system. This may reflect
repetitive patterns in the structure of the system. The “symmetry” is the expected or standard
reference value. Hence, a standard pattern may be considered to be a symmetry. A simple system
could then be reduced to an exact integer number, say n, of the pattern without any information
loss. However, if the system has information that is lost in representing it using n patterns, then
a measure of the lost information, or the remainder of the system after the symmetry is removed
(i.e., the “modulo”) may be considered to represent a measure of its complexity. This concept is
echoed by Bertelsen (2003) who states complex systems cannot be completely reduced without
information loss. The modulo, hence becomes, the indication of complexity from the perspective
of the chosen symmetry. In this interpretation, the measure of complexity of a system is sensitive
to context, as the choice of symmetry can change the reducibility of a system. Typically, the
symmetry value may be based on prior data, field standards, or experiences. The choice of
symmetry also defines the perspective of inquiry, meaning the reducibility of a system is
predicated on the area of interest. This idea is also stated by (Gell-Mann and Lloyd 2004) who
noted that complexity is subjective to context.
In related literature, López-Ruiz et al. (1995) discuss the concept of “disequilibrium” as a measure
of the distance from the mean state. As a system diverges from the expected point of stable
equilibrium, the disequilibrium increases, indicating an increase in the measure of complexity in
the system. This idea echoes the discussion of complexity as per Crutchfield and Young (1989).
The system modulo a given symmetry is analogous to a deviation from a point of equilibrium, and
the remainder value is analogous to the extent of the deviation. Hence, the difference, as well as
the extent of disequilibrium, can be used as an indicator of complexity. This leads to the question
of “How much disequilibrium or deviance is too much before the system either collapses or
becomes too much of a risk?” (Hall 2003). Bertelsen and Koskela (2005) describe the
disequilibrium as a variance - a cause for concern for part manufacturing but using the same ideadisequilibrium causes uncertainty. System resilience, robustness, and risk are not addressed in
this dissertation but recommended for future work.
Construction operations can be represented using activity cycle diagrams due to their inherent
repetitive nature. At the project level, linear and repetitive projects can also be represented as a
sequence of repeating activities based on unit production rates. These repeating patterns provide
the ability to select meaningful equivalence classes and symmetries. Context will drive such a
choice based on whether the inquiry is at the operation, project or management level (Gell-Mann
2002). A question such as “Is this a financially complex project?” might indicate one result, but for
the same project, “Is there scheduling complexity?” might yield a different result. The idea of
context is echoed by ICCPM (2012) who described the problem as using “multiple metaphors and
dialects” to obtain different perspectives on the problem.
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2.3 Foundational Work: Measuring Complexity
Previous works on system complexity have focused on posterior assessment and the classification
of projects as “complex” or “not complex”. There is, however, a need to define and develop a
metric for complexity based on an identification of factors that directly contribute to project
complexity (Gidado 1996). Without such a metric, it is not possible to reduce system complexity
or engineer a system to be more resilient to complexity.
Previous research (Dao et al. 2016; Owens et al. 2012) has used the Delphi method to rate and
differentiate between the extent to which factors, such as cost, design, project context, project
finances, infrastructure size, infrastructure interconnectivity, infrastructure newness, and project
uncertainty, contribute to project complexity (Safapour et al. 2018). In their approach, using the
highest ranked factors, Owens (2012) selected and investigated five case studies by interviewing
the project participants involved. The research by Owens (2012) and additional research by Vidal
et al. (2011) identified factors that tend to correlate with, or are markers of, complex projects.
While the results of this research can be used to rate the complexity of a project based on a list
of criteria, they stop short of directly identifying a general set of conditions and project
characteristics that give rise to complexity. The recommendations also provide limited guidance
on ways to re-engineer projects to reduce the complexity at the source. The qualitative nature of
the study and the generalization from expert opinion based on five case studies limit the longterm applicability of the research as innovation and technology continue to shape project means
and methods.
Remington and Pollack (2007) identified characteristics of complex systems as hierarchy,
communication, control, emergence, phase transition, non-linearity, adaptiveness, and sensitive
dependence on initial conditions. A discussion of these characteristics follows.
Control is defined by Remington and Pollack (2007) as the ability of the overall system to maintain
order and carry out the overall objectives - even with the individually linked yet semi-autonomous
units operating simultaneously. Whitty and Maylor (2007) discuss the difficulty of controlling
projects when individual agents are interacting but are simultaneously dynamically changing.
Gransberg et al. (2013) noted that as complexity increases the ability for a project manager to
maintain control decreases in complex projects.
Emergence occurs when the level of interaction among the components of a system reaches a
critical point and the overall system accomplishes tasks that requires the entire system (i.e. not
by any individual components) (Remington and Pollack 2016). These tasks may or may not be the
intended objective of the overall system or may or may not even be productive for the system.
Multiple sources commonly refer to this by saying “the system is greater than the sum of its parts”
(Remington and Pollack 2007, Whitty and Maylor 2007, Paina and Peters 2012, Gideon et al. 2005,
Manson 2001). Whitty and Maylor (2007) note a lack of sufficient tools to determine what
interventions that managers could take to be effective in complex projects to compensate for
unintended emergent issues.
Phase transition is described as a “radical” change in the form of operation of the same system
components to accommodate changing parameters (Remington and Pollack 2007, Eusgeld et al.
8

2011, Paina and Peters 2012). This varies from adaptiveness in that it is not changing the internal
components (or agents) but is reconfiguring them to perform a different function. Adaptiveness,
in contrast, may change the internal components to improve the overall system to meet new
objectives (Whitty and Maylor 2007). However, Eusgeld et al. (2011) noted tools are lacking to
analyze and model these adaptive systems.
Non-linearity is a result of feedback to the system from other system components (Remington
and Pollack 2007, Eusgeld et al. 2011). The information gained through dynamic feedback loops
influences the components of the system and provides the basis for the adaption or phase
transitions that may take place. The communication is the medium through which the data moves,
but the dynamic feedback contains the information that can reinforce plans or alter the direction
of the operation (Paina and Peters 2012). This concept is reinforced by Murray et al. (2007) who
found a greater number of interactions (communication) does not automatically mean greater
connectivity (useful data). Unaddressed in the work by Murray et. al (2007), is the lag time in
feedback loops and their impact on the overall system.
The organizational hierarchy of complex systems is often described as a system-of-systems
whereby each individual sub-component can (normally) operate independently but also have the
ability to combine into a complex system when needed (Gideon et al. 2005; Remington and
Pollack 2016). Using smaller units of operation, large tasks can be broken into manageable pieces
and distributed. One area not addressed in this definition is the diminishing returns of distributed
work processing, i.e., addressing the balance point between parallel processing of tasks verses
the overhead needed to manage all of the agents. Gideon et al. (2005) has developed a taxonomy
for systems-of-systems based on their design, operation, and domain.
The International Centre for Complex Project Management Standards (2012) classify projects as
complex if the project is emergent, adaptive with sensitivity to initial conditions, and contains
feedback loops (ICCPM 2012); characteristics that are also supported by Remington and Pollack
(2007) in their study of system complexity. It has been suggested that a pathway to improving
efficiency and reducing delays in project management is to assess and address the challenges
presented by complexity of projects (ICCPM 2012; Owens et al. 2012).
Complex system characteristics, specifically feedback systems, organizational hierarchy, and
control are examined through the lens of communication. Communication channels are the links
between the components of a system. System performance is an indication of the strength of
those links. Matisziw et al. (2012) examined the structure and performance of a network as a
measure of network robustness. They determined that nodal interactions, when dynamic,
significantly impacted the robustness of a network. This is because certain edges or nodes in a
network have higher importance and therefore have a higher impact on the stability of the
network (Matisziw et al. 2010). Their objective was to identify locations on the network that could
be reinforced and fortified to improve its survivability in the event of an attack. From a volume of
information perspective, Miller (1956) found that an individual’s maximum manageable
interactions is “about” seven. Flood (1987) calls this the “threshold of complexity”. FEMA (2018)
calls this the “span of control” and suggests that it be limited to 5 individuals or resources for
every 1 supervisor. To compensate beyond this threshold, Miller (1956) found that people begin
to chunk information or package it into larger pieces, often with less detail. Further work is needed
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to examine the impact of this information chunking. Further work should examine the rate of
information flow between the manager and multiple individual agents and how the cycle of
information gathering and sharing is impacted. There is an interesting parallel with work done by
Payne (1976) regarding decision making by individuals. That work noted that in a complex
situation, decision makers used an “elimination by aspects” to filter out alternative options in
order to make a decision. This is effectively discarding information intentionally when there is too
much information to process.
Attempts at measuring complexity in health care system scaling research have compared crosssectional case studies. Their objective is to use internal system dynamics as a method of
identifying critical management points, scenario planning and exercise activities with dynamic
rules (Paina and Peters 2012). The results indicate that dynamic interactions, stakeholder
participation, and local conditions were all important components in the scaling of health
systems. McCabe (1976) measured complexity in computer programming as the number of
potential paths a program can follow using graph theory. Although feedback loops are accounted
for in this metric, the “interactions” between agents is limited or fixed. Attempts to measure
system complexity have also included using statistical methods using entropy as a model (LópezRuiz et al. 1995). They discuss the idea of a “disequilibrium” as a measure of the distance from
the probable likely (mean) state. This is multiplied with an information variable (representing
information stored in the system), to give a measure of complexity. As an example, if the likely
probable state has a disequilibrium of zero, the complexity of the system is zero (López-Ruiz et al.
1995). This approach does not account for the number of interactions of the system specifically.
Gidado (1996) developed a measure of complexity but limited it to the length and cost of a project
and did not address other objectives. The Gidado (1996) measure was based on the number of
components and the duration of the workflow. Finally, Austin et al. (2002) discuss the advantage
of using graphical models to visualize complexity, noting that graphical models can lead to a
greater understanding of the information flow in a system.
While reducibility of projects has been discussed in this research, as a way to reduce failures of
information flow, there is a tension between the goals of reducing project complexity and still
maintaining a robust system that is capable of adapting to component failures. Research has been
conducted by Gribble (2001), Iyer et al. (2013), and Paul et al. (2004) examining the robustness of
networks when nodes or edges are removed and examine the ability of the network to continue
to function. This work identifies critical nodes or edges which, if removed, causes network failure.
Using the research from this dissertation, the previous work leads to the questions: is it better to
have a less robust system (more prone to failure) or a less complex network, less prone to
disequilibrium (delay, information loss) and failure? Does a robust network require complexity?
It is important to note that much of the network research is based on infrastructure or social
networks, that do not have a “project” objective the network is “trying to accomplish”. Therefore,
the failure of a “node” or component in a project system does not necessarily preclude another
component from taking over the vacant role (i.e., if the project manager is suddenly incapacitated,
a subcontractor might be able to step in and conduct that role).
The properties of the system allow for the failures in information flow. These include, but are by
no means limited to:
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•
•
•

Too much information for the channel to accommodate, or the receiver to process (Miller
1956)
Not enough information is available for the receiver to make use of the information
(Comfort et al., 2004)
Delay in the system and the information does not arrive in an acceptable timeframe to be
used as desired (Moynihan 2009).

2.4 Points of Departure
A summary of the points of departure from the literature are:
•
•

Previous works identify indicators of complexity but not metrics to quantify a system’s
complexity.
Complexity research has tended to use Delphi approaches (reliance on experts) rather
than qualitative measures. This limits the scope of the research use to specific fields. It
also potentially limits the application as it provides no direction on how to reduce
complexity in the system.

These points lead to the following research questions:
• How is system complexity defined and measured?
•

Can information flow failures be related to changes in complexity?

2.5 Proposal
To answer these questions, this dissertation proposes to develop a metric of complexity that
provides a quantitative metric and provides guidance on how to reduce complexity.
The hypothesis of this research is that complexity is a characteristic of the organizational and
operational structure of an event (i.e., a project or incident) based on the number and nature of
interactions within the system.
This hypothesis is tested across both hypothetical and real-world events to support the creation
of a metric that measures the system complexity. Based on a review of definitions of complexity
in mathematics and other inter-disciplinary bodies of systems literature, this research devises a
definition that can be used in different contexts to characterize the complexity of a project or
event. Based on the definition by Crutchfield and Young (1989), this research recognizes that the
answer to “how complex is a project?” also depends on the context within which the question is
posed. For instance, a project with multiple interacting operations and schedule dependencies
may not have the same level of complexity in its financing and delivery methods. However, this
dissertation posits that the complexity of each of these contexts can be characterized using
identical systems and mathematical constructs of equilibrium and phase change. Based on these
ideas, this research demonstrates that the number and nature of critical interactions within a
system is a good measure of the project complexity, given a context specific construct. In turn,
this number provides a simple metric that can be used by practitioners to identify interactions
that increase the complexity in a project and engineer ways to reduce the project complexity. The
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dissertation concludes with several case studies identifying complexity as a function of
interactions between project components. The case studies are analyzed through the framework
this dissertation developed to measure and reduce complexity.

Figure 1: Structure of research
Figure 1 outlines the structure of this research. The first step in testing this hypothesis is to identify
methods of representing a system that accounts for both the number and nature of system
component interactions. Both visual and mathematical representations will be use and are
discussed in Chapter 3.
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3 Building Blocks of Complexity
This chapter will develop the methods of representing systems for analysis. Based on the
literature, two of the parts of complexity are of particular interest, component interactions and
disequilibrium which will be discussed as the number and nature of the interactions. Determining
when there is disequilibrium and where component interactions occur is important in
determining a system’s complexity as it highlights what is making a system complex.
Systems are built from individual components that interact to complete the system task.
Identifying the component interactions from the overall system behavior presents challenges as
the component interactions are combined and may appear as one from outside the system. These
interactions are the points of information transfer within the system. Given the objective of this
dissertation is to determine the reason for information flow failures, identifying the transfer
points of information is a critical step in identifying points of failure.
Disequilibrium refers to the difference between a balanced and an unbalanced component
interaction. In physical systems, this can be manifested as a delay or a “waiting” for one
component to finish a task before the next task can begin. As mentioned in Chapter 2, López-Ruiz
et al. (1995) discuss the concept of “disequilibrium” as a measure of the distance from the mean
state. As a system diverges from the expected point of stable equilibrium, the disequilibrium
increases, indicating an increase in the measure of complexity in the system. This idea echoes the
discussion of complexity as per Crutchfield and Young (1989). The system modulo a given
symmetry is analogous to a deviation from a point of equilibrium, and the remainder value is
analogous to the extent of the deviation.
In construction project management, the use of equilibria or balance-based principles is not
uncommon (Yang and Ioannou 2001). Hence, combining the ideas from Crutchfield and Young
(1989) and López-Ruiz et al. (1995), it is conjectured that the concept of disequilibrium can be
used to indicate system complexity in that interaction. A system in disequilibrium is more
irreducible given a symmetry, and the remainder – or the deviation from the equilibrium – can be
considered to be an indicator of the complexity in the project component. The question at hand
is: what are the factors that are likely to push a system out of balance or introduce a disequilibrium
in a system? For example, in a simple construction operation design where the principle of
continuous operation is used to balance production rates between equipment, balance is more
difficult to achieve if there are more interacting cycles. Hence, the hypothesis is that an important
factor contributing to the potential for deviations from the symmetry is the number of
interactions within a system.
Given that both component interactions and disequilibrium are the components of complexity,
measuring the disequilibrium and the interactions is important in determining a system’s
complexity. Since each point of interaction has the potential to be in disequilibrium, the more
points of interaction there are, the more potential there is for disequilibrium. A key point of this
dissertation shows: the more interactions, the more complex the system.
A goal of this research is to take the expressions of the principals of operations and use them to
measure complexity. Delay and mismatch of resources are examples of disequilibrium and are all
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indications of complexity. A better understanding of complexity sheds light on operational
efficacy. This is presented several ways: as signals, as a phase diagram, and by representing a cycle
as a circle in the time domain.
Graphically, cyclic systems and cyclic system components can be represented as signals
(waveforms) with a characteristic frequency that reflects the component behavior. Using a signal
representation allows the system to be analyzed using signal processing techniques.
As the number of interactions increase, the number of degrees of freedom increase, which in turn,
increase the possible states within which the system can exist. Thinking about this from the
perspective of any given interaction between two equipment types in a system, each interaction
has an expected pattern of behavior (the symmetry). Deviations from this expected behavior
results in a disequilibrium (using López-Ruiz et al. (1995)) and can be measured, as the deviations
are already quantitative in nature (e.g., dollars over budget, days over schedule, cubic yards of
materials short, minutes spent waiting or idle). The proposed measure of complexity for this paper
is to use the number of interactions for a given symmetry (perspective) of the project. The
disequilibrium detected in the interaction is important, as the complexity arises from all of the
ways in which a degree of freedom can vary and thus introduce uncertainty into the system.
In the next section, construction operation is mathematically analyzed to show that as the number
of interactions increase, so does the number of points at which the system can deviate from a
desired equilibrium. This dissertation discusses how this measure can be used at all project levels
as a method for assessing project complexity and examines several methods of measuring the
nature and number of interactions.

3.1 Complexity in Construction Operations
Operations with repetitive processes, like construction processes, can be reduced to cyclic
interactions. Each cycle has an output metric (time, productivity, etc.). At the project level, linear
and repetitive projects can also be represented as a sequence of repeating activities based on unit
production rates. These repeating patterns provide the ability to select meaningful equivalence
classes and symmetries. Context will drive such a choice based on whether the inquiry is at the
operation, project, or management level. A question such as “Is this a financially complex
project?” might indicate one result, but for the same project, “Is there scheduling complexity?”
might yield a different result. The analysis of these cycles determines the balance point of the
interacting resources. At this balance point, the driving design principle is that of continuous
operation. Continuous operation reduces delays and wait times through the uninterrupted flow
of resources. Continuous operation also implies the system is in equilibrium, or that there is a
balance in production rates of equipment at each interaction point leading to zero waiting times.
However, when the production rates of equipment are unbalanced, the waiting times can become
non-zero and vary irregularly, causing the system to move into disequilibrium. For such a system,
estimating the net production rate becomes less reducible due to the unexpected delays and
waiting times. This increases irreducibility of the system. Therefore, by determining the extent of
delay, or imbalance in the system, and the number of interactions in the system that can cause
such imbalance (disequilibrium) and irreducibility, the level of complexity can be measured.
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Graphical models are used to visualize interactions and disequilibrium through theoretical
examples. Real systems do not usually give off signals that can be measured, but the purpose of
these graphical models and signal processing is to highlight methods to understand how systems
work and components within those systems interact.
Consider the example of a hypothetical mainline concrete paving operation. A concrete paving
machine is being serviced by trucks that are transporting the concrete mix from a batch plant to
the paver. The batch plant is being serviced by water trucks delivering water. The water is crucial
for maintaining a continuous supply of ready-mix concrete, necessary for the paver to function
continuously. The activity cycle diagram for the operation is illustrated in Figure 2. In one cycle
the trucks deliver concrete from the batch plant to a paver (paver cycle), while in the other cycle
the batch plant is supplied by trucks delivering water from a water source (water cycle). Ideally,
the number of resources will be balanced so as to minimize idle time of all of the interacting
equipment. In Figure 2, the number of trucks in the paver cycle is seen from two directions: the
number of trucks needed to keep the paver continuously operating: n0, and the number of trucks
to keep the batch plant in non-stop production: n1. The condition for the paver cycle to be balance
is, n0=n1.

Figure 2: Three component construction cycle
This relationship will be the basis for analyzing the cycle. The paver production rate is denoted by
P (in cubic yards of concrete per hour), the batch plant production rate is C (in cubic yards of
concrete per hour), the water required in the batch plant is G (in gallons per cubic yard of concrete
produced), and the water supply from the source is W (in gallons per hour). In addition, n2,
denotes the number of water trucks needed to keep the batch plant in continuous operation.
The number of water trucks needed (n2) to keep batch plant in continuous operation is:
CG = 𝑛! W
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(1)

𝑛! =

CG
W

(2)

If CCT is the capacity of the truck (in cubic yards) then the number of concrete trucks (n1) servicing
the batch plant each hour to keep the batch plant in continuous operation is:
C = 𝑛" C#$

(3)

C
C#$

(4)

𝑛" =

The number of concrete trucks (n0) needed to keep the paver in continuous operation each hour
is:
P = 𝑛% C#$

(5)

𝑛% =

P
C#$

(6)

𝑛% =

𝑛" P
C

(7)

(𝑛" C#$ )G
W

(8)

Substituting for CCT, from Eq. 4 in Eq. 6:

And substituting for C, from Eq. 3 into Eq. 2:
𝑛! =

If n0=n1, the balance condition for the paver loop, Eq. 6 in Eq. 8 can be substituted to get:

𝑛! =

PG
W

(9)

Therefore, at the balance point for both the paver cycle and the water cycle the condition is:
𝑛% P
= =1
𝑛" C
𝑛! =

CG PG
=
W
W

( 10 )
( 11 )

At the balance point, the system is in equilibrium, and the expected production of the system is
easily reducible from the primary production rates P, G, C and W. However, if the system is not in
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equilibrium (i.e. n0≠n1), delays are present in the system and there is a higher level of complexity
as the number of variables cannot be related and reduced without knowledge of the extra variable
CCT. This increases the level of complexity in the system.
The equilibrium conditions as a function of the number of trucks (dimensionless parameters) can
be analyzed as follows:
•
•

If n0>n1, the paver production is greater than the batch plant (P>C). This is not physically
possible (an inviable state) but is a mathematical solution indicating that the paver is idle.
If n0<n1, the batch plant production is greater than the paver (P<C), and the batch plant is
idle.

The summary of these results is listed in Table 1. The production rates for the paver and batch
plant are represented by P0 and C0 respectively.
Table 1: Production Rates
Paver
Batch Plant n0/n1
Production Production
P=P0

C=C0

Idle
Equipment

n0/n1 >

Production System
Batch Plant
Based on
Interactions Interactions

Paver

Co

5

3

Batch plant

P0

5

3

None

P0

3

2

1
P=P0

P=P0

C=k1C0,

n0/n1 <

k1>1

1

C=K2C0,

n0/n1=1

such that
n0/n1=1
Table 1 also illustrates the possible states that the system can exist in. For this system, there are
5 interactions if n0≠n1:
•
•
•
•
•

Trucks (n0) with batch plant
Trucks (n0) with paver
Trucks (n1) with batch plant
Trucks (n1) with paver
Batch plant and water truck

But, if n0=n1, the interactions reduce to 3:
•
•
•

Trucks (n0) with batch plant
Trucks (n0) with paver
Batch plant and water truck
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Therefore, by eliminating the delay (disequilibrium) in the system, the number of interactions is
reduced. For a system, as the number of states increase, so do the degrees of freedom of the
system, and therefore the complexity of the system increases from the batch plan perspective.

3.2 Phase Diagram
A phase diagram can be used to illustrate the possible states in which a particular interaction of
the system can exist. In two dimensions, Figure 3 illustrates the phase diagram for the
construction paving example showing the possible states in which the production rates of the
paver, batch plant, and the overall system can relate to each other. Below the balance point (P=C),
the equipment driving production is the paver, and above the balance point, the equipment
driving production is the batch plant. In the phase diagram representation (Figure 3),
disequilibrium would be represented by the distance between system production line and the
production of the paver (if P<C), or the batch plant (if P>C) (discussed later in Figure 24. The
complexity is the number of interactions of the system - when P=C, there are two interactions
(plus the water truck interaction which is not shown in the phase diagram). However, as the
number of interactions increase so do the number of possible phases, the degrees of freedom,
and the available of deviations from the system equilibrium, meaning the complexity increases.

Figure 3: Phase diagram of paving construction example
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3.3 Circular Representation
A circle is an effective way of representing a cycle, especially if there are multiple interacting cycles
involving multiple equipment. Consider the example of a gravel quarry operation involving a single
excavator and a number of trucks (n1) working in tandem to excavate aggregate for a batch plant.
Figure 4 shows the activity cycle diagram consisting of two cycles.
The truck cycle period is (time to load D0, travel to batch plant t12, unload D1 and travel back t11)
denoted by T1. Hence, the following can be asserted:
𝑇" = D% + 𝑡"" + 𝑡"! + D"

( 12 )

In this example, a single excavator requires n0 cycles to load a single truck. The excavator cycle
period (time to swing, cut, and dump in the truck) is denoted by T0. Hence, the following can be
asserted:
𝑛% 𝑇% = D%

( 13 )

Then n1 trucks are needed to balance the excavator production and ensure continuous operation.
𝑛" D% = 𝑇"

( 14 )

Figure 4: Example with an excavator and trucks. The excavator requires multiple cycles to load a
truck.
Given the periodicity of cycles, the cycle time (or period, T1) of the truck can be represented by
the locus of a point around the circumference of a circle (Figure 5). This requires the theoretical
construct of a radius of the cycle, R1, such that:
2𝜋𝑅" = 𝑇"
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( 15 )

The circle represents the cycle time for the truck akin to a period. The partial hypocycloid inscribed
in the circle represents the truck/excavator interactions. This hypocycloid is the locus of a fixed
point on a circle with radius R0 that is rolling inside the circle with radius R1, where the radius R0
corresponds to the cycle time of the excavator T0 such that:
2𝜋𝑅% = 𝑇%

( 16 )

Figure 5: Balanced circle representation of excavator and truck interactions.
Figure 5 represents only the cycle time of one truck. The three interaction points in it shows that
it takes three cycles of the excavator (n0 = 3) to completely load one truck. Once loaded, the truck
continues on with the rest of its cycle traversing the circumference of the outer circle, until it
returns back to interact with the excavator again – this time is denoted by: t11 + t12 + D1. For a
perfectly balanced operation this is the same time that the excavator will use to load the other
trucks. As there are n1 trucks, it can therefore be asserted that:
(𝑛" − 1)D% = 𝑡"" + 𝑡"! + D"

( 17 )

Figure 6 is replicated for each additional truck, with the excavator interactions seamlessly moving
from one truck circle to the next as the excavator continues to load each truck without stopping.
If the operation is perfectly balanced, with continuous operation, then each of the truck circles in
Figure 6 can be superimposed into a single circle that represents all of the trucks and the
excavator) and is illustrated in Figure 7.
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Figure 6: Excavator/truck interactions with multiple trucks.

Figure 7: Summation of truck/excavator interactions. The intersections between the circle and
the hypocycloid are the interaction points between the trucks and the excavator.
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Hence, the single balanced interaction between the n1 trucks with cycle time T1 and one excavator
with cycle time T0, requiring n0 cycles to load a single truck can be illustrated as a complete
hypocycloid with a circle of radius R0 rolling inside the circle of radius R1. Combining equations 13
and 14, yielding:
𝑛" 𝑛% 𝑇% = 𝑇"
𝑛" =

𝑇"
𝑛% 𝑇%

( 18 )
( 19 )

Hence, for a system in equilibrium, the product of the number of trucks and excavator cycles (or
number of excavators) is the ratio of the cycle times. n0 and n1 must be integers, therefore the
constraints on loading times and production rates are less flexible. When additional interacting
equipment cycles are added, this formulation can be recursively extended as illustrated in Figure
8. The system equations can be expressed generally as follows:
𝑛&" 𝑇 &" = ∆"

( 20 )

Where n'1 is the number of trucks to keep the batch plant busy, T'1 is the cycle time of the trucks
to keep the batch plant busy, and ∆" is the truck unloading time.

Figure 8: Adding a loader that takes the material from the truck to a batch plant.
The total cycle time of the loader, T2, is a function of the unloading time of the truck ∆" , the travel
times of the loader (t21 and t22).
∆" + 𝑡!" + 𝑡!! + ∆! = 𝑇!

( 21 )

The number of trucks needed at ∆" is:
𝑇!
= 𝑛!
∆"
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( 22 )

The loader time to transport and unload gives:
(𝑛! − 1)∆" = 𝑡!" + 𝑡!! + ∆!

( 23 )

Substituting equation 23 into equation 21 gives:
(𝑛! − 1)∆" = 𝑇! − ∆"

( 24 )

Distributing ∆" out and using equation 20 to substitute for ∆"
𝑛! 𝑛&" 𝑇 &" = 𝑇!

( 25 )

𝐼𝑓 𝑛&" = 𝑛" 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇 &" = 𝑇"

( 26 )

then, the system is balanced. This provides the product of the number of loaders and trucks with
the truck cycle time is equal to the cycle time of the loader:
𝑛! 𝑛" 𝑇" = 𝑇!

( 27 )

Substituting in for the excavator cycle time T0 and the number of cycles of the excavator, n0:
𝑛! 𝑛" (𝑛" 𝑛% 𝑇% ) = 𝑇!

( 28 )

𝑛% 𝑛" ! 𝑛! 𝑇% = 𝑇!

( 29 )

Therefore, the cycle time Tm of any equipment in the construction cycle can be related to the
quantity of other equipment and the initial equipment cycle time T0 by:
𝑇' = 𝑛% 𝑛" ! 𝑛! ! 𝑛( ! … 𝑛')" ! 𝑛' 𝑇%
'

( 30 )

')"

𝑇' = 8 𝑛* 8 𝑛, 𝑇%
*+%

,+"

( 31 )

Equation 31 allows us to mathematically express the balance conditions for an operation with m
interaction points.
The expansion of systems can occur in multiple directions. Systems can be linear (as in Figure 8)
or can be in branch configurations (Figure 9). Additional equipment and additional interactions
increase the potential for disequilibrium (more intersections must align, reducing the solution
space). As the number of interactions increases, the layers of the circle diagram increase. Figure
10 shows the concept of nested circle diagrams. Each level (nested circle) represents another
equipment component. The radius of each circle is determined by equation 15.
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Figure 9: Branch configuration of a system.

Figure 10: Nested circle diagram. Each layer represents a component interaction.
In a circular representation of a system, disequilibrium would appear as an incongruence of the
inner hypocycloid and outer circle. The incongruence can be expressed as a phase angle difference
or as a time delay. Figure 11 illustrates the truck excavator example with delay ε in the system.
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Figure 11: Unbalanced circle representation of truck and excavator interactions.
The equations for an unbalanced system must account for ε. Equation 14 is modified to:
𝑛" (D% + ε) = 𝑇"

( 32 )

𝑇" − 𝑛" ε
𝑛"

( 33 )

Or,
D% =
And from equation 13:
𝑛% 𝑇% = D%

( 34 )

𝑛" 𝑛% 𝑇% = 𝑇" − 𝑛" ε

( 35 )

Becomes:

If T1 is set at 1 (time period) as a reference value, then:
𝑇% =

(1 − 𝑛" ε)
𝑛" 𝑛%

( 36 )

The phase diagram and circular diagram are not both ideal indicators for all systems. For systems
that need multiple interactions with the same equipment types (for example, the excavator taking
multiple cycles to load a truck), the circular representation provides a better visual indication of
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multiple cycle interactions. However, for a single interaction (one cycle for each equipment) the
phase diagram provides a more useful depiction of the interactions.

3.4 Waveform Representation
Using the example of an excavator and truck in a digging, loading, hauling system, (Figure 12) the
excavator and truck each can be represented by a waveform and their interactions and
disequilibrium visually seen.

Figure 12: Example with an excavator and trucks. The excavator requires multiple cycles to load
a truck.
Starting from the number of trucks n1, the truck cycle period T1 is the cycle time results in the
following parameters of the waveform (note, normally signals are referred to in Hertz (Hz) or
cycles per second. However, in this dissertation, the frequency will be represented in cycles per
unit time or CPT for notation purposes as the frequency in Hertz would be very small and
cumbersome to work with and tiresome to read):
𝑓" =

1
𝑇"

( 37 )

The frequency is a function of the cycle period. As the truck is the reference component in this
example, the frequency is assigned as 1 CPT.
𝑓" = 1 CPT
( 38 )
•
•
•

n1= 4, the number of trucks is 4 for this example.
n0=3, as it takes 3 excavator cycles to fill the truck.
𝜀 is the delay when either component (truck or excavator) needs to wait for the other.
Non-zero values of 𝜀 indicate an unbalanced system (disequilibrium).
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Using these parameters, the signal for the truck is given by:
𝑦" = sin(𝑓" ∗ (𝑡 − 𝜀))

( 39 )

𝑦" = sin(1 ∗ (𝑡 − 𝜀))

( 40 )

Plotting for several cycles produces the plot in Figure 13 showing the truck waveform. For these
plots there is no y-labeling as the y-value is a construct derived from equation 15. Key takeaway
from these plots is the relative frequency to each component.

Figure 13: Waveform of a single truck.
Similarly, for the excavator, the frequency is n0 x n1. This is due to the 3 excavator cycles needed
to load a truck, and then the truck cycle period being 4 times the truck loading time.

𝑓! = 𝑛% ∗ 𝑛" = 3 ∗ 4 = 12

( 41 )

y! = sin(12 ∗ (𝑡 − 𝜀))

( 42 )

This results in the plot in Figure 14: Waveform of excavator, showing the excavator frequency is
12 CPT.
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Figure 14: Waveform of excavator
Of interest, is the combination of these waveforms to determine the system waveform
interactions. Figure 15 shows the sum of the truck and excavator waveforms.

Figure 15: Sum of truck and excavator waveform.
To analyze the combined waveform, a Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) is used (equation 43) to
decompose the combined signal into its component frequencies. The FFT is a computationally
efficient algorithm to calculate the Fourier transform of a discrete time signal (note, while the
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actual signals in these examples are continuous, they can be represented by discrete time
simulations (such as in the plots in this research). The plots in this dissertation look at a small
segment of the signal, usually 1 to 1.5 cycles. Therefore, in order to improve the frequency
resolution, the signals are zero padded to increase the signal length up to next “power of 2”
number of samples (N2). Additionally, the sampling is greater than twice the Nyquist rate to
ensure aliasing is not occurring, which would provide erroneous results in the frequency domain
plots, and the number of samples (N) are sufficiently large as to be an integer number of periods
to avoid time leakage.
The FFT shows the two frequencies. Using the method of a FFT is not bidirectional. First, projects
or emergency responses do not have signals to record. Second, while the FFT can be used to
decompose signals into component frequencies, this does not necessarily indicate the number of
interactions. However, this method is intended to show that interacting components can generate
signals and the FFT can show how the inherent structure of a project/event can be visualized as
the number of components or as delays in components vary.
0)"

𝑋(𝑘) E 𝑋(𝑛) 𝑒 )-!./0 ,

𝑓𝑜𝑟 0 ≤ 𝑘 ≤ 𝑁 − 1

( 43 )

1+%

Where, X(k) is the kth harmonic and X(n) is the nth input sample.
Plotting the FFT of the summation of the truck and excavator signals (Figure 16) indicates the
presents of two frequencies: 1 and 12 CPT, matching the input frequencies for this example.
The next question is: what happens as the number of system components grows? If there is a
third component (a loader for example that the truck dumps into), how does the additional
component impact the system waveform. As expected, the addition of another component’s
waveform shows up on the FFT as another frequency present (Figure 17). This pattern continues
to scale as additional components are added. Figure 18 shows an example with 5 components. As
the number of components N goes to infinite, the number of frequencies present will also go
infinite, provided they are unique frequencies. Repeated frequencies will show up as stronger
signal strength in the FFT magnitude plot.
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Figure 16: The sum of two components and the FFT magnitude and phase of the sum.

Figure 17: Summation of three signals. The three frequencies are present in the second plot.
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Figure 18: Summation of 4 signals, the FFT magnitude, and phase
Additional comparisons of frequencies are included in 6A
3.4.1

Infinite Components

As the number of components or interactions increases to infinity, the waveform continues to
evolve. Figure 19 shows what happens for very large numbers of components at random
frequencies. As the number of frequencies increases, the overall of the sum will continue to
increase. Figure 20 shows the sum of large numbers of frequency waveforms but with a linear
increase in frequency rather than random frequencies. The implication is that emergence is not
just a function of interactions but the order or topology of those interactions impacts the results.
Once conjecture is that the differing results between the random and sequential frequency
summations are an artifact of sampling.

31

Figure 19: Sum of very large numbers of frequencies (n=50,000 random frequencies) and the FFT
normalized magnitude showing the random frequencies used.
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Figure 20: Sum for very large number of frequencies (n=50,000, linearly increasing) and the FFT
normalized magnitude.
3.4.2

Unbalanced Systems

These examples thus far have assumed the system is in equilibrium (balanced). However, if the
system has delay (disequilibrium) the waveform is impacted. The plots in Figure 21 show the
excavator waveform “waiting” followed by its next three cycles. This makes a noticeable impact
when the truck and excavator waveforms are added. The FFT is also computed and shows two
frequencies present (1 CPT and 4 CPT) as before as well as a small indication of a signal at 7.6 CPT.
This additional frequency is a result of the delay in the system skewing the “true” frequency of
the excavator waveform.
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Figure 21: Two component signals with the excavator signal delayed by 0.025.
As the delay increases, the results of the FFT of the sum of the truck and excavator waveforms
are similar (Figure 22), with additional harmonic frequencies present. This result means that as
the delay in the system increases, the disequilibrium increases.
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Figure 22: As delay increases, the FFT indicates additional frequencies present as harmonics.
Next, combining both 5 frequencies (components), each at a different delay, produces Figure 23
which shows the summation waveform. The FFT of the waveform, however, shows the 5
frequencies present but also the harmonics resulting from the delays in the component
waveforms. The result shows the FFT can be used to identify the frequency components of
interacting components can help visualize the underlying system and the impact of delay
(disequilibrium) in a system.
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Figure 23: Results of varying both frequency and delay.

3.5 Metric of Complexity
There are four primary takeaways from the methods discussed above:
1. From the paver example in Figure 2, the system is not in equilibrium, estimating the net
production rate requires additional variables (n1) that can be eliminated when the system
is in equilibrium. Thus, a system in equilibrium is more easily reducible than a system in
disequilibrium and requires management of fewer information parameters. The phase
diagram (Figure 3) helps identify the conditions under which equilibrium can be
maintained (when P=C in the Figure 3 example) while the phase diagram in Figure 24
shows a system that is in disequilibrium because n0/n1 is not equal to 1, and therefore,
the operating point is not at the balance point - causing the paver to be idle. The
disequilibrium makes these cases irreducible and according to the definition by
Crutchfield and Young (1989), higher complexity.
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Figure 24: Phase diagram showing disequilibrium at the operating point.
2. The circular diagrams indicate that as the number of interactions increase so do the
number of balance points, in a multiplicative fashion, adding to the number of potential
deviations from equilibrium conditions, and combinations thereof. This leads to a very
large number of possible irreducibilities in the system.
3. Realistically, systems tend to equilibrium conditions, but rarely function in perfect
equilibrium. In addition, the extent of movement away from an equilibrium condition can
also be difficult to measure and translate into an easily applicable metric (e.g., consider
developing a distribution of delay times). However, reducing the number of interactions
can reduce the number of ways in which a system can deviate from equilibrium, and
reduce the number of possible points that need to be managed. Managing the level of
disequilibrium at each interaction, or minimizing the deviation at each balance point, can
help reduce the complexity of the project. In other words, an operation design with fewer
interactions and operating close to the balance point conditions will have a lower
complexity and will be likely to have better project objective outcomes.
4. Using the Fast Fourier Transform of the combined waveforms will identify the component
waveform frequencies helping to reveal the underlying structure of the system. The
disequilibrium is identified by the appearance of harmonic frequencies.
Hence, this dissertation posits that complexity is a function of the number of interactions because
these are points where disequilibrium can exist. The disequilibrium is the indication of an
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information flow failure, but the complexity is the number of interactions. To reduce complexity,
the objective is to reduce the number of driving interactions and manage the project to ensure
that each interaction is as close to equilibrium conditions as possible.
Therefore, the proposed metric of complexity is the number of defining interactions in the system,
given a management principle. As the number of interactions increases, so do the degrees of
freedom for the system. As degrees of freedom increase, each interaction has the possibility of
being in disequilibrium from the expected or normal value. Disequilibrium is demonstrated in the
components of analysis: block diagram, waveforms analysis, phase diagram, circular diagram, and
equation 31. These are all representations of cycles and show interaction points and
disequilibrium between components.

3.6 Organizational Complexity
So far, the discussion has used operational examples to illustrate how the number of interactions
is a metric of complexity. However, the same metric can be very usefully applied to organizational
systems as well. In the case of construction operations, the continuous operation principle is used
as a symmetry to assess system reducibility by establishing balance points as equilibrium
conditions. Organizationally, similar principles that reduce lag times and improve communication
cycle times can be used to define a symmetry that reflects the context at hand. For example,
consider the following hypothetical scenario depicted in Figure 25: The contractor (hired by an
Owner) has 4 sub-contractors. Each sub-contractor can be in a fiscal state of “under budget”, “on
budget”, or “over budget”. In this case, the symmetry is the budget (“on budget”). There are 5
interactions (between the contractor and each sub-contractor, and the owner and the
contractor). The measure of complexity is a function of the number of interactions (in this case
5). There is disequilibrium in 4 of the 5 interactions.

Figure 25: Interactions between contractor, owner, and sub-contractors
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Consolidating these interactions (i.e., reducing the number of sub-contractors) can reduce the
number of degrees of freedom in the system and thus the complexity of the project. This approach
to assessing complexity of a project also has the advantage of emphasizing the structure of the
organization as a function of the number of driving interactions rather than just the overall system
size.

3.7 Parallels in Other Systems
There are several potential parallels of this work to systems in other fields. Controls and signal
processing share a similar mathematical background with feedback, gain, control, and filtering.
Geographical Information Systems also have parallels with the idea of disequilibrium described in
this dissertation and through the use of symmetry. These parallels are not addressed in this
dissertation but are potential points of departure for future work.
The field of network stability also uses much of the same language as project management when
discussing disequilibrium and complexity. For example, Johansson and Hassel (2010) state that
critical infrastructures “often have high degrees of complexity”. Also there is discussion in the
literature regarding interdependencies (Rinaldi 2004) between infrastructure components that
translate well into this dissertation’s discussion on component interactions.
This chapter has developed methods to represent systems visually and mathematically and
analyze their interactions by number and nature. Next these methods and representations
developed in this chapter will be applied to projects in chapter 4.
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4 Complexity in Service System Operation
Three case studies are used to illustrate the use of the metric for complexity. A distinction is made
between systems that have pre-determined structure verses systems that are organized ad hoc.
The former project involves planning that reflects the underlying domain structure. For example,
in a construction project, there is a schedule outlining agreed upon start and end dates and a work
breakdown structure that reflects the sequence and duration of tasks to be performed. Hence, a
construction operation is represented using cycle diagrams and production rates are measured as
a function of cycle times. This is in stark contrast to an emergency response that is typically an ad
hoc operation with volunteer involvement and a structure that emerges in an unplanned way out
of the needs and urgency of the moment. Planning and exercises do take place to develop the
“symmetry”, a general frame of reference for a type of incident. However, the actual situation on
the ground sometimes lends itself to an ad hoc state of operation, where components operate
based on the general planning guidelines that may be in place. In operations where there is little
to no prior planning in place, components extensively rely on the experience of past events and
exercises. The following case studies include a construction project involving pre-construction
(project) planning. The two emergency response case studies are ad hoc events where the
responders and incident management team rely on general emergency operation plans, but
primarily on experience from previous events and exercises.
The reason for assessing both the planned and ad hoc organizations is to test if the following
fundamental questions can be applied to both, and if so, what the conclusions can be drawn about
the complexity from the mathematical analysis in the last chapter:
•
•
•

Is there disequilibrium in the interactions and is this causing information flow failures?
How is the measure of complexity applied in this case and what is that measure?
Can the measure of complexity be used to reduce the complexity in the system?

4.1 Construction Operations
4.1.1

Case Study: Rock River Project

Using the methods and concepts of complexity and disequilibrium discussed in Chapter 3, this
dissertation will analyze the case of the Morgan Street Bridge in Rockford, Illinois as an example
of how reducing the number of interactions can reduce the complexity of a project.
4.1.1.1 Project Background and Context
The Morgan Street Bridge project replaced the aging 900-foot spandrel concrete arched vehicle
bridge over the Rock River (Figure 26) in Rockford, Illinois. Originally built in 1890 to connect the
east and west parts of Rock River, the replacement of the bridge was seen by the city as an
opportunity to jumpstart the city’s efforts for urban renewal (Prange 2013). Revitalizing
neighborhoods on both sides of the bridge was an objective of the city and the bridge was seen
as an integral component of the community. As the owner, the city solicited input from the
community, believing that the bridge could serve as the centerpiece for community
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redevelopment. Input was solicited throughout the design and construction phases using a
context-sensitive solution process. The project objectives, which are the project symmetry,
developed through the input received from focus groups, interviews, and surveys were:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Increase traffic capacity
Improve safety for vehicles and pedestrians
Improve mobility to both sides of the river (including pedestrians)
Enhance aesthetics of the area
Accommodate fishing from the bridge
Anchor the redevelopment of the surrounding community

Based on the community input, the design selected for the replacement structure was a network
tied arch bridge. Due to the cost estimate of the project (baseline cost was $21.8 million), the
Federal Highways Administration required a Value Engineering study (Prange 2013). The
expectations of the study were low, as the project was considered a typical construction project
with mostly known variables. The Value Engineering study team was composed of 14 individuals
including members from the Illinois Department of Transportation, representatives from the city,
utilities, railroad relocation specialists, construction specialists, and a Value Engineering
facilitator. The study group was broken into five teams: Bridge, Railway, General, Design
Suggestions, and an Out-of-Scope group. Each group was asked to develop proposals that would
reduce costs or add to the objectives of the project (Prange 2013).

Figure 26: Map of project area
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The Value Engineering process took place during a two-day workshop. During the workshop, 78
proposals were created. After deliberation, the Value Engineering team recommended 11
proposals of which 9 proposals were accepted, resulting in savings to the project of $1.6 million
(Prange 2013). Three of the most unexpected proposals were:
1. Remove the rail line from under the bridge on the east embankment.
2. Reuse the concrete from bridge demolition (and from an additional project the
city was undertaking nearby) for fill on the river embankment.
3. Add a roundabout at the Seminary Road intersection east of the bridge.
These three projects resulted in a savings of $1.26 million and furthered the goals of the project
(Prange 2013).
The first proposal was the result of an attempt to reduce the cost of maintaining rail operations
during construction, which would involve using a flagger. After discussing the options, it was
determined that the railroad companies involved would be willing to, and in fact had previously
discussed, permanently rerouting the rail traffic. This allowed them to eliminate a difficult to
maintain diamond crossing, and four at-grade crossings, and improve the safety and efficiency of
rail operations (Prange 2013). The removal of the at-grade crossings also reduced traffic
congestion in the city. The elimination of this single interaction between the bridge and the rail
line (denoted by “A” in Figure 26) allowed several other changes to take place in the project. These
changes included, a redesigned bridge span of a 370-foot tied arch main span (rather than a 300
foot in the original design) with shorter approach plate girder spans, elimination of a retaining
wall (denoted by “B” in Figure 26), a lower bridge profile, and others discussed below. The result
was a savings of $815,000 (Prange 2013). The recreational opportunities afforded by the removal
of the rail line were the most significant. Now walking and biking trails could be added to the
project, an existing rail bridge up stream of the project (denoted by “C” in Figure 26) could be
repurposed into a pedestrian bridge, and greenspace with river front views and access could be
added - all of which furthered the objectives of the project.
The removal of the rail line also allowed the bridge piers to be removed from the river. The initial
design required the bridge piers to be located in the river due to the interference from the rail
line under the east end of the bridge. There were concerns about construction method cost and
long-term scour due to the river current. In addition, the removal of the piers had positive
environmental impacts as the river contained several threatened species (Prange 2013).
The proposal for reuse of concrete from the bridge demolition was an attempt to both reduce
environmental impacts and cut costs. Concrete from demolition would be used to build up the
riverbank (north of the bridge area), which was to serve as a public recreational use resource, thus
adding to the social vitality of the area. Reusing the old concrete would reduce the amount of fill
that would be needed to be brought in from off-site. The city was already planning on the
demolition of other buildings near the west approach to the bridge, and it was proposed that
recycling the demolition materials from both the bridge and these other structures would save
costs. This proposal saved $220,000 (Prange 2013).
The roundabout project proposal was on a section of land east of the bridge approach. The land
contained obsolete public housing units that the city was planning to remove as part of an urban
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renewal campaign (Prange 2013). This proposal was considered out of scope (and out of the
construction limits), but the boundaries of consideration were expanded to include this area as
doing so would improve traffic flow and reduce accidents - both of which were project objectives.
It would also reduce costs compared to constructing and maintaining a standard signalized
intersection, reduce noise and pollution (from idling vehicles at a signal), and be more aesthetic
(Prange 2013).
4.1.1.2 Interactions of the Project
The project contains 5 bridge interactions defined by how the asset to be replaced was interacting
directly with its immediate surroundings. They were as follows (see Figure 27: Interactions from
the perspective of the bridge.):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Bridge-River
Bridge-Rail line
Bridge-Recreation use space
Bridge-Environment
Bridge-Corridor enhancement (Seminary Road)

Figure 27: Interactions from the perspective of the bridge.
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The bridge interacted with the Illinois Railroad, which passed under the east approach. One of the
significant costs of the construction plan was the cost of maintaining rail operations while the
existing bridge was removed, and the new bridge constructed above the rail line (Prange 2013).
Another interaction was between the bridge and the corridor enhancement - which was directly
impacted by the Seminary Road intersection to the east. This interaction impacted traffic flow and
volumes. There were two interactions between the bridge and the environment, waste from
demolition and new bridge piers in the river. Concrete from the demolition was to be removed
from the site and disposed. The bridge piers were going to be placed in the river, impacting the
river flow, environment, and the river would also impact the piers and complicate construction.
4.1.1.3 The Driving Interaction and Disequilibrium
Due to the river velocity, the potential for scour, and the cost of construction, the preferred design
was to remove the piers from the water and place them on each shore (Prange 2013). However,
due to the proximity of the rail line to the river, there was not sufficient space for both the pier
and the railroad. The rail line would also create a safety issue during construction and be
expensive. During a Value Engineering study, a discussion on how to reduce the cost of rail traffic
flagging during construction lead to the determination that the railroad line could be removed
entirely. This allowed the piers to be located out of the river, and the track removal allowed the
abandoned rail grade to be put to recreational uses. The creation of recreational opportunities
was a major objective of the project. The track reconfiguration also allowed the removal of a
railroad diamond further along the track and several other at-grade crossings.
4.1.1.4 Complexity Analysis
The perspective, or area of interest (the symmetry), is important to the analysis. This analysis is
bridge centric as the bridge is the main component of the project, meaning each primary
interaction is directly interacting with the bridge. However, it could be community revitalization
centric, for example, and would have a different number of interactions.
Prior to the removal of the rail line, there were 5 bridge interactions, with 5 secondary or chained
interactions. Secondary interactions are defined as interactions that are not directly connected to
the bridge but can still have a secondary impact through (Figure 28). For example, the bridge
interacts with the river through the bridge piers, and the river causes scour on the piers. This
means there are 5 degrees of freedom or states of the system (see Table 2). This research has
defined the number of interactions from a perspective as the metric of system complexity,
therefore, the complexity of this system is 5.
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Figure 28: Interactions without the rail line. The solid lines are primary interactions, and the
dashed line indicates a secondary interaction.
Table 2: Complexity

Project Interactions
Original Plan

10

Bridge
Interactions
5

After rail line
removed (Value
Engineered plan)

4

3

Complexity
Measure
5
3

Removing the rail line from the project reduces the number of project interactions to 4, with 3 of
those directly impacting the bridge. This means there are 4 total interactions and a complexity of
3 for the system. As there are fewer states in which the system can exist, the complexity of the
project is reduced.
4.1.1.5 Summary
By reducing the bridge interactions of the project from 5 in the original plan to 3 in the Value
Engineered plan, the complexity of the project was reduced. Critically, this reduction in
45

interactions does not reduce the primary objectives of the project - quite the opposite, reducing
the interaction of the bridge and the rail line increased opportunities to better align the plan with
the project objectives (the symmetry). The correlation to the Crutchfield and Young (1989)
definition of complexity, is that project becomes more reducible with limited “information loss”
when better aligned with the project objectives. This illustrates the importance of identifying the
driving interactions of a project determining the disequilibrium in that interaction, the level of
complexity, and how to reduce critical interactions to reduce the system complexity.

4.2 Emergency Management
This section discusses complexity through the lens of emergency response (a special case of
project management). This section begins with a background in emergency response concepts
and operations.
4.2.1

General Case:

The concepts of complexity are examined through the lens of emergency response. Using the
definition from Crutchfield and Young (1989), we can define the symmetry as a “normal
condition” (no emergency). Or it can be defined as the “normal” or “planned” incident response.
The difference between the actual condition and the symmetry is the disequilibrium. The
disequilibrium is detected in a system through dynamic feedback. This can be thought of as the
system trying to correct itself (return to the mean). However, when the feedback is sufficient, the
feedback can bring about a phase transition in the system causing the system to settle at a new
equilibrium (if the system is stable). During an emergency response, the Incident Action Plan (IAP)
is an outline of the “normal” response (the symmetry). However, as the event progresses,
deviations from the “normal” response (due to differing initial conditions, resource availability,
etc.) are the disequilibrium. The Incident Commander makes adjustments based on this
disequilibrium using the dynamic feedback (the information flow coming back from the
responders on the ground). However, if the disequilibrium is sufficiently large, a drastic change in
the response plan (IAP) may be necessary (Bigley and Roberts 2001). This can take the shape of a
change in mission objectives or may require a change in tactics. Miller (1956) and Flood (1987)
above discussed information volumes. When overloaded, responders began to chunk
information, packing it into larger pieces but sacrificing detail. This loss of information is the result
of the disequilibrium in the system.
This research has discussed complexity through as the number and nature of interactions. This
dissertation will now discuss this scaling through the lens of emergency response to determine
the impact information flow.
4.2.1.1 ICS Structure and Scaling
ICS has a hierarchical structure based on functions performed during the incident response. The
structure uses an Incident Commander (or a group consisting of a commander from each
responding agency or level of government which form a “Unified Command”) as the manager of
the response (Bigley and Roberts 2001). This dissertation will use Incident Commander and
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Unified Command interchangeably as they perform the same functions (however, a Unified
Command does have the potential for disequilibrium between its members). Under the Incident
Commander, there are four “General Staff” positions (Operations, Logistics, Planning,
Finance/Administration), each led by a Section Chief (see Figure 29) (Bigley and Roberts 2001;
Texas A&M Engineering Extension Service (TEEX) 2016). This is very different from how some
agencies respond in a routine emergency where they are normally organized as a standalone
organization that must deal with all of the General Staff functions themselves. In ICS, the decision
makers at the top of the structure (Incident Commander) formulate the objectives and policies of
the incident response while the responders assigned under the General Staff positions implement
the tactics devised at the General Staff level (Anderson et al. 2004). The structure has been
examined by Moynihan (2009), who concluded that ICS is a “mode of network governance, akin
to a network administrative organization (NAO)” where an external centralized coordinator is
charged with organizing the response of multiple independent organizations.

Incident Commander or
Unified Command

Operations Section

Planning Section

Logistics Section

Finance/Administration
Section

Figure 29: Generic Incident Command Structure
As mentioned previously, the Incident Command System structure is scalable. This is
accomplished by only assigning General Staff positions when that section’s activities become too
burdensome for the Incident Commander to manage alone (Bigley and Roberts 2001). Two
examples are used to illustrate scaling: first, a traffic stop with one police officer. Second, a multivehicle crash involving three police officers, a fire department, and medical first responders.
In the first example, a single car is pulled over for speeding. The police officer serves as the
Incident Commander as well as all of the General Staff positions (Figure 30). The officer
determines the objectives of the stop, as the Incident Commander, based on a “typical” behavior
for someone pulled over at a traffic stop. This mental model or Incident Action Plan is the
symmetry of the system. The methods and tactics to accomplish the objectives are determined,
as the Operations Section Chief. The officer gathers information and develops the Incident Action
Plan, as the Planning Section Chief. As the Logistics Section Chief, the officer determines the
communications needs and what equipment will be needed for the stop. And the officer
documents the resources used, and the time required for the stop as the Finance/Administration
Section Chief. As the stop progresses, the officer may learn new information (after running the
vehicle license plate and learning the vehicle is not registered for example). Based on this new
information (dynamic feedback), the “typical” stop may now be in disequilibrium. The officer
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makes adjustments (perhaps asking for additional information from the driver) and reassesses the
situation to see if those adjustments reduces the disequilibrium.

Incident Commander
(Operations, Logistics, Planning,
Finance/Administration)

Figure 30: Example ICS structure for a single traffic stop incident
In the second example, four cars are involved in an accident on slippery roads. Three police
officers are dispatched as well as a fire department and medical first responders.
The Fire Chief is the Incident Commander on the scene (Figure 31). The initial reported conditions
(from the 911 call) will be the basis of the mental model of the incident that the responders will
have- their symmetry. After arriving on scene, the first step is a scene size-up to determine what
the objectives are (broadly, these are life safety, property preservation, environmental
protection). The initial mental model is adjusted based on this information (dynamic feedback).
The difference between the initial mental model and the new model is the disequilibrium. They
assign Police Officer 1 as the Planning Section Chief to document the accident and conduct
interviews (gather information). The tactical operations of law enforcement, fire, and medical
services will be overseen by the Operations Section Chief, but because the role is unassigned, it
falls to the Incident Commander to fulfill the role of Operations Section Chief. The Operations
Section Chief (the Incident Commander in this example) then assigns a “Traffic Control Team”
consisting of one police officer with two fire fighters to manage traffic control. Then, medical first
responders are assigned to see to the medical needs of the occupants of the vehicles involved in
the crash, and a firefighting team is assigned to perform victim extrication from the vehicles and
fire protection duties. The Incident Commander then asks the dispatcher (at the 911 Center) to
document the resources used and the time each unit arrived and departed the scene, making the
Dispatcher the Finance/Administration Section Chief. As the Logistics Section Chief is not assigned
(in addition to the Operations Section Chief), the Incident Commander performs the duties of
those section chiefs. With the assignments made to meet the objectives of the incident, the
system enters a new equilibrium, and the disequilibrium drops to near zero. However, the
situation is dynamic. Perhaps the condition of one of the victims changes. This is a change in
disequilibrium. There is some information loss as the Incident Commander may not be the first
informed (the medical responders will attend to the victim first and inform the IC when the
situation is stabilized). This short time interval has both disequilibrium (a change in the situation
from the plan), and information loss because it takes time to inform the IC that there is a change.
There is also dynamic feedback to this new information (the responders treat the victim
differently). If the initial responders arrive on scene and determine that there is a hazardous
materials spill, the large disequilibrium creates a phase transition. The system begins to work
towards a new equilibrium. In this case, the information loss occurs prior to the disequilibrium.
The example illustrates how the Incident Command System can expand or contract to meet the
needs of the incident and how the characteristics of complexity are present in emergency
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response. The need to make decisions based on incomplete information is a frequent feature of
emergency response (Yu and Lai 2011).

Incident Commander

Operations Section
Chief
(also the Incident
Commander)

Planning Section Cheif
(Officer 1)

Finance/Administration
Section Chief
(Dispatch center
operator)

Traffic Control Team

Medical Response Team

Fire fighting team

Figure 31: Example ICS structure for a multi-vehicle traffic accident
Returning to the question of minimum disequilibrium: Can the disequilibrium ever reduce to zero?
With different agencies and multiple responders, there is always some information loss between
them, and this information loss represents disequilibrium. The dynamic feedback to this constant
background disequilibrium is indicated by comments about preferences in communication: “Can
you give me an update every 15 minutes?” “Please change to talkgroup 31EMER for all traffic so
I can hear what’s going on.” Contributions of disequilibrium include a number of issues of
emergency response identified by Oomes and Neef (2005) and Comfort et al. (2004): 1) timecriticality: does the incident management scale fast enough to manage the responders and
resources arriving at the incident; 2) multidisciplinary nature of responders, and if they can
communicate and work in teams; 3) multiple layers of the response leading to the question
“Who’s in command?”; and 4) how to maintain situational awareness. The Incident Command
System works well in addressing three of these concerns. First, the issue of time-criticality of
response scale-up is addressed by the Incident Commander’s ability to appoint General Staff
positions as needed, allowing the incident management to scale-up quickly. Second, the
multidisciplinary nature of (many) responses is addressed by two components of ICS: Unified
Command, and common operating framework. Having a Unified Command allows a
representative of the lead responding agencies to have buy-in with the response objectives and
planning. Responders are therefore not “taking orders” from other agencies, but rather their own
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people. Having a common framework for the response (ICS) that is mandated across the United
States by FEMA allows all responding agencies to know what to expect before they arrive on scene
(reducing disequilibrium). Third, the issue of “Who is in command?” is addressed by specifying
that the command will be kept at the lowest possible level of government (usually the county or
city) for an incident. When additional assistance is needed from higher levels of government (state
or federal), this assistance is requested in the form of resource requests (materials, responders,
incident management teams, etc.). The question of situational awareness is about information
flow, and not well addressed in ICS but is a critical in terms of disequilibrium.
4.2.1.2 Information Flow
While the scaling flexibility of the Incident Command System is well documented, the scaling of
the information flow within the ICS is not (Bigley and Roberts 2001, Oomes and Neef 2005). As
emergencies present in different sizes, the information flow for the incident must scale. As an
incident grows, the first obstacle is scaling from the Incident Commander, who is also the acting
Section Chief for all four sections, to having four Section Chiefs the Incident Commander must
now communicate with via feedback loops (giving instructions and receiving information from
field units). The success of the response is dependent on the ability for information flow to scale
with the ICS structure in an appropriate amount of time (Oomes and Neef 2005). In the above
example of a simple traffic stop, most of the information flow is internal to the officer. However,
the officer may request information from outside such as requesting a check on the driver’s
history from a dispatcher (Figure 32). The delay in the system comes from waiting for this
information to be returned before the officer can refine the Incident Action Plan (i.e., what they
are going to do). In the multi-vehicle accident example, as the ICS has scaled up, the information
flow has grown more complicated, and as a result, the number of delays in the information flow
path has increased (Figure 33).

Figure 32: Information flow for a single traffic stop incident. The delay introduced is the
Information Request/ information Delivery feedback loop.
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Many of the incident management problems, identified by Moynihan (2009) and discussed above,
are fundamentally information flow problems - responders not knowing where they fit into the
response structure, differing or unclear mission objectives or tasks, difficulty determining who is
part of the formal response structure and who is not (especially with volunteer organizations),
and responders not knowing the capabilities of other responder agencies (Moynihan 2009).
Delays in the information flow can exacerbate these problems. Comfort et al. (2011) states the
makeup and diversity of the components impact the information flow, as specific needs and
abilities for information flow may vary, further adding to the disequilibrium.

Figure 33: Information flow for multi-vehicle traffic accident
Work by Comfort et al. (2004) examined information quantity, quality, and flow, noting that a lack
of important information at critical moments can significantly impact the response. Comfort et al.
(2004) found that as more useful information was available and communicated to responding
agencies, the efficiency of the response improved. The initial report of the incident can be
incomplete or inaccurate, causing the first responders to arrive on scene unprepared for the
existing conditions (large disequilibrium). The information between the first responders and the
dispatch center may not be clear due to improper communication procedures. Dispatchers may
confuse agencies with one another or may not communicate with other dispatchers clearly, such
as information being misinterpreted at the call center. Information from the dispatch center to
the Incident Commander may not flow or be inaccurate due to the multiple information
transactions such as those listed above. Additionally, information from one responding agency to
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another is also a source of failure with agencies not communicating the necessary information in
a timely manner. In addition to these lapses in human communication flow, there are also
technological communication issues such as incompatible, unmaintained, or insufficient
quantities of equipment. Many first responding groups are volunteers and may lack sufficient
training. Some responding groups choose to not implement ICS. Therefore, working with other
responders more difficult as there is no common operating framework. Simpson and Hancock
2009) note in their review of emergency response literature that the common thread in
emergency management is working in a disorganized environment. Using graph theory to locate
cut points in the information network, Comfort et al. (2004) identified critical nodes that, if
removed, could cause information islands in a network, or teams that did not receive or transmit
the information that was required to perform their tasks or allow decision makers to give further
instructions. All of these issues contribute to the disequilibrium of the system.
The path, timing, and quantity, and accuracy of information passed through the ICS structure will
help dictate the effectiveness of the emergency response. When information is not readily
available (delay), the disequilibrium increases. A balance point between incoming information to
decision makers (typically the Incident Commander) and the information passed on as
assignments to teams in the field, must be found to provide the most effective information flow.
Too much information coming into decision makers overwhelms them and risks important
information being missed (Manoj et al. 2007). Insufficient information or information arriving too
late, prevents appropriate assignments for teams. A lack of information flow between the Incident
Commander and the Operations Section Chief will add another step in the communication chain,
adding additional delay to the system and increasing disequilibrium.
Fundamentally, communication problems in emergency response are information flow problems.
As mentioned previously, combining the ideas from Crutchfield and Young (1989) and López-Ruiz
et al. (1995) implies that information loss is an indication of disequilibrium. For example,
disequilibrium is the difference between the Incident Action Plan (IAP) and the actual conditions
on the ground. The IAP is a model of the situation and will be informed and adjusted based on the
dynamic feedback received by the Incident Commander from the responders.
Next, two emergency response cases will be presented to demonstrate how the measure of
system complexity can be applied and complexity can be reduced by reducing the number of
interactions within the response system.
4.2.2

Case Study: Houghton Search

The following case study is from a missing person search in Houghton, Michigan in August of 2019.
It is an example of how the proposed metric of complexity can be applied to reduce system
complexity. The study discusses the interactions between the components and the disequilibrium
present in the form of information flow failures.
4.2.2.1 Background
An 82-year-old woman with dementia left her home in west Houghton approximately 13:00 on
Saturday, August 17, 2019. Her family searched the area until approximately 16:00 when they
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called the Houghton Police Department. The Houghton Police searched the area until 18:20, when
they contacted Superior Search and Rescue for assistance. Search and Rescue arrived at 18:50 and
began sending out search teams. The Michigan DNR fire-spotting plane was diverted to the area
and searched from the air until dark. A private citizen also took his airplane up and searched from
the air until dark. Searching on the ground in the woods continued until dark. Then searching on
the roads (and around buildings) continued until 1:00 on August 18, 2019 when the search was
paused and scheduled to resume at 8:00.
During the night, a request was made for Civil Air Patrol (CAP) air assets to the Air Force Rescue
Coordination Center and was approved by the Michigan State Police. CAP was scheduled to begin
flying at 7:00.
At 8:00, Superior Search and Rescue resumed the search with assistance from several local fire
departments, law enforcement agencies, and medical first responders. Additional volunteers
began arriving and by 11:00 were overwhelming the staging area. At the peak, there were nearly
160 volunteers.
At 14:35, a team reported finding the subject. Michigan Tech EMS was dispatched to the scene to
assess and extract the subject. The woman was about 20 feet uphill of a snowmobile trail (in an
area that had been searched several times) under a tree root ball. She was conscious and had no
obvious injuries. She was transported to the hospital. Search teams were recalled and
demobilized.
4.2.2.2 Search Operations
The searching process is based on cycles, different for each components of the search. These are
described for several components below.
Incident Commander/Unified Command Team (Figure 34) activity cycle:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Develops the initial Incident Action Plan (based on initial information available)
Holds tactics meeting with the Operations Section Chief
Begins planning next operational period (next steps) with Planning Section Chief
Reviews information coming back from the field (relayed from Operations Section Chief
or Planning Section Chief).
5. Updates Incident Action Plan with new information
6. Repeats steps 2-5.
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Figure 34: Incident Commander/Unified Command Operational Cycle
Operations Section Chief (Figure 35) activity cycle:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Holds tactics meeting with Incident Commander/Unified Command
Develops assignments for teams
Briefs teams on assignments and receives debriefing information from teams
Develops next assignment for teams
Repeats steps 1-5

Holds tactics
meeting

Reviews
information
from the field

Develop
assignments
for teams

Brief/
debriefing
team
Figure 35: Operations Section Chief Cycle
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Search Team (Figure 36) activity cycle:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Briefs from Operations Section Chief to get assignment
Leaves staging on deployment (transportation)
Searches in the field (carrying out assignment)
Returns to staging (transportation)
Repeats steps 1-5
Briefing/Debriefing
from Operations
Section Chief

Returning to staging
from deployment

Leaves staging on
deployment

Searching in the
field

Figure 36: Search team cycle
Each of these cycles is linked together. In Figure 34 and Figure 35, for example, the Incident
Commander and the Operations Section Chief are linked through the tactics meeting. The
Operations Section Chief and the Search Teams are linked through the briefing/debriefing in
Figure 35 and Figure 36. These linkages are the interactions in the overall system and can be seen
in the combined system in Figure 37.
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Figure 37: Interactions between component cycles
4.2.2.3 Interactions
The interactions associated with this search are broken into two parts the initial operational
period (the first day of the search) and the second operational period (second day of the search).
As mentioned previously, the structure of an emergency response is fluid and scales up and down
as needed. Therefore the interactions scale and reorganize as the incident progresses.
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Initial Operational period (based on Figure 38):
•
•
•

Incident Commander with:
o Operations Section Chief
o Law Enforcement
Operations Section Chief with:
o Search teams 1 and 2
Law Enforcement with:
o Officers 1 and 2
o K9 Unit
o Dispatch Center

Second Operational Period (based on Figure 39):
•

•

•

•

•

Incident Commander with:
o Operations Section Chief
o Planning Section Chief
o Logistics Section Chief
o Law Enforcement
o Emergency Medical Services (EMS)
Operations Section Chief with:
o Search teams 1-10
o Staging Manager
o Medical First Responders
o Civil Air Patrol
Law Enforcement with:
o Officers 1, 2, 3
o K9 Unit
o Dispatch Center
Planning Section Chief with:
o Documentation group
o Staging Manager
o Operations Section Chief
Logistics Section Chief with:
o Transportation providers
o Food providers
o Communication support team

4.2.2.4 Areas of Disequilibrium
Disequilibrium was present in the search on a number of levels:
•

Information flow: The following information flow issues occurred during the incident:
o Sometimes information was not relayed to or from the Incident Commander due
to the Incident Commander being occupied with other tasks
o The number of teams during the second operation period became unmanageable
for the Operations Section Chief to debrief and process all of the information fast
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•

•

•

enough to update assignments efficiently. The result of this was a delay where
teams were waiting for their next assignment.
o Due to many of the searchers being volunteers from the community with no
previous searching or emergency response experience, there was a significant
gap (disequilibrium) in their knowledge of search operations, safety protocols,
and expectations. Field training was provided, but further slowed the planning
and assignment process.
Information from subject’s family: Information about the subject was relayed to the
Incident Commander through law enforcement. This information was verbal and
incomplete. For example, the subjects last name was misunderstood (and relayed to
searchers as the wrong name, which the was not corrected for the Incident Commander
until the second operation period.
Weather: The weather was a contributing factor to information flow failures. There was
heavy rain and wind during most of the second operational period. This limited the
effectiveness of air support from Civil Air Patrol, made team briefings and debriefings
difficult to hear, and significantly impacted the information transfer of assignments and
team debriefing information all of which is done on paper and using paper maps.
Search cycle: Due to the large numbers of search teams involved in the response during
the second operational period, the search cycles outlined above in Figure 35 and Figure
36 had to occur more quickly than they would normally occur in order to minimize the
waiting (and likelihood of angry confrontations) of volunteers.
Incident
Commander
Liaison (Law
Enforcement)

Operations
Section Chief

Officer 1

Search Team 1
Officer 2
Search Team 2
K9 Unit

Dispatch
Center

Figure 38: Initial operational period organizational chart
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4.2.2.5 Measurement of Complexity
The organizational structure of the response is shown in Figure 38 and Figure 39. As discussed in
the Incident Command System structure above, the structure of the response changed as the
incident progressed and the response scaled.

Incident
Commander

EMS

Liaison (Law
Enforcement,
EMS)

Officers (x3)

Operations
Section Chief

Staging Manager

Planning Section
Chief

Logistics Section
Chief

Documentation
Group

Civil Air Patrol

Transportation

Communications

Medical First
Responders

Search Teams
(x10)

Figure 39: Second operational period organizational chart.
As discussed above, the simplified cycle diagram in Figure 40 shows how the search information
flow moves through the operation. Information flow is two-way and occurs at predetermined
intervals. The Incident Commander develops the incident objectives and passes this information
on to the Operations Section Chief. The Operations Section Chief reports the status of the
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objectives back to the Incident Commander. There is only one Incident Commander and one
Operations Section Chief.
Next, the Operations Section Chief develops the tactics to accomplish the incident objectives and
assigns search teams to carry out those tactics. The search teams then debrief with the Operations
Section chief upon completing their assignments. For a search there could be multiple search
teams that interact with the Operations Section Chief.
Each Search Team is composed of members. Each member has specific tasks assigned to them to
complete as part of the search. These can include navigation, radio operation, etc. In a typical
search, each team is composed of 4-7 people. Although for this search, teams varied in size from
3 to 15 people at various points during the incident.

Figure 40: Information flow cycle diagram for a search.
Converting the cycle diagram to a circular diagram shows the interactions at each level of the
organization. Figure 41 shows how the interactions occur as the incident progresses. The circles
rotate inside each other as time moves forward. Each dot represents an interaction between a
circle and the circle that encloses it.
Next, the waveforms of this search are calculated. For the relationship between the Operation
Section Chief and the search teams, because the number of teams was constantly changing for
this analysis 9 teams will be used. However, there will be a delay added representing the delay
resulting from overcrowding the Operations Section Chief with too many teams. The result is a
circular representation shown in Figure 42 rather than Figure 41. Each team will also be shown
with 4 people.
Therefore, the parameters are:
n0=1, Incident Commander
n1=1, Operations Section Chief
n2=9 (teams per Operations Section Chief)
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n3=4 members per team
ε=0.0833, the delay in the search teams receiving their briefing or debriefing, equating to
5 minutes.

Figure 41: Circular representation of the search operations for a balanced system, showing the
various levels of organization and the multiple Search Teams and members.
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Figure 42: Unbalanced search circular representation of the search system.
The waveforms of each component are shown in
Figure 43. The frequencies and delay are shown in each plot. The Incident Commander and
Operations Section Chief have the same waveforms, indicating that interaction is in balance.
However, the Search Team waveform has a delay every cycle (while the team waits for their
briefing or debriefing) indicating this is an unbalanced interaction.
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Figure 43: Component waveforms from Houghton Search.
The results (Figure 44) show that the three waveform frequencies are present in the FFT of the
summation of the four components. However, as the Incident Commander and the Operations
Section Chief both have the same frequency, the magnitude of that frequency (1 CPT) is twice
that of the other frequencies present, indicating there are two components at that frequency.
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Figure 44: Summation of the four SAR component waveforms and the FFT of the sum, showing
the magnitude and phase angle.
4.2.2.6 Driving Interaction
The driving interaction, or limiting interaction, for this incident was the interaction between the
Operations Section Chief and the search teams. Due to the volume of volunteers, many of whom
had no search or emergency response experience, there was disequilibrium in the form of delay
in assignment creation and information loss due to abbreviated briefings and debriefings which
contributed to the complexity of the system. The Incident Command General Staff noted the
number of volunteers was increasing rapidly, assigned a Deputy Operation’s Chief and added
responsibilities to the Staging Manager (Figure 45). These additional people assisted with
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organizing, training, and briefing volunteers which reduced the number of interactions seen by
the Operations Section Chief (Table 3).
Incident
Commander

Liaison (Law
Enforcement,
EMS)

EMS

Officers (x3)

Operations
Section Chief

Staging Manager

Search Teams
(x5)

Deputy
Operations Chief

Planning Section
Chief

Medical First
Responders

Civil Air Patrol

Documentation
Group

Search Teams
(x5)

Logistics Section
Chief

Transportation

Communications

Figure 45: Second operational period (after additional staff added) organizational chart.
Table 3: Complexity by operational period

Operational Period

ICS
Interactions

Operations Chief
Interactions

Complexity
Measure

1 (initial)

8

2

2

2

24

15

15

2 (after additional
staff)

25

7

7

4.2.2.7 Summary
While ultimately successful, the disequilibrium present in several aspects of the Houghton Search
impacted the efficiency of the response. While steps were taken during the incident to reduce the
disequilibrium, the result was the total number of system interactions increased due to adding
additional positions for the purpose of reducing delays in search team briefings and debriefings.
While this increased the complexity, it reduced the disequilibrium.
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This case study reinforces the concept that using the number of interactions as a measure of
complexity is really the potential for disequilibrium failures, but it is not a given that an increase
in complexity will increase the disequilibrium in a system. This case continues to reinforce the
importance of identifying the driving interaction and the disequilibrium in that interaction.
4.2.3

Case Study: 2018 Western Upper Peninsula Flooding

The largest case study of this dissertation is from the 2018 flash flooding in Houghton County,
Michigan. The value of this case study is that it is a larger response than the previous case of the
Houghton Search, both in terms of responders and the geographic area. It also involved
components from outside the area at both the state and federal level with all of the coordination
required to adhere to the protocols of the state and federal government.
4.2.3.1 Background
On June 17, 2018, central Houghton County endured a significant rain event that dropped
approximately 6.7 inches of rain in a 6-8 hour period (Figure 46), classified by the National
Weather Service as a 750 to 1000 year rain event. The result was catastrophic flash flooding
beginning at 4:35AM over the highest populated portions of the county causing large scale
infrastructure and personal property damage in excess of $120 million.

Figure 46: 6-hour Precipitation total: 1AM-7AM, June 17, 2018. Source: NOAA
Local resources were almost immediately overwhelmed. Additional assistance was requested
from the State of Michigan through a request for a State Disaster Declaration, which was granted.
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The State Disaster Declaration opened up the availability for state resources to assist with the
local effort. All of the state resources were organized through the State Emergency Operations
Center (located 500 miles away). While additional resources were critical to the response, those
resources also came with a nearly doubling of the number of people (components) that were now
interacting with the response system. This significantly strained the information flow in the
response at the Incident Command level.
While significant damage was done to the road system in the county, there was also significant
but localized damage to homes. Approximately 468 homes were impacted with three destroyed
and 50 with major damage. FEMA estimated the individual damage estimate to be $2,908,095
(Federal Emergency Management Agency 2018b). Cleanup and repairs were organized through
a Volunteer Resource Center (VRC) where homeowners could call and request volunteers to help
clean out homes or yards. More than 2,131 volunteers (about 6% of the county population)
helped with hundreds of projects including: digging mud out of basements, moving rocks out of
front yards, debris removal, and transportation of equipment. While a Presidential Disaster
Declaration was received for the Public Assistance (DR-4381-MI), a federal declaration for
Individual Assistance was not approved, leaving homeowners without financial assistance from
the FEMA.
The response can be divided into four stages: initial, stabilization, repair, and recovery. With each
stage having a different organizational structure and its own set of interactions. This dissertation
will examine primarily the initial and stabilization phases of the incident as they involved the most
interactions and information flow issues.
The structure of the initial response (Figure 47) involved almost exclusively local entities.
Following a modified ICS structure, the Unified Command consisted of the Houghton County
Emergency Management Coordinator and the Houghton County Sheriff. The structure essentially
had each entity report directly to the Unified Commanders (while the County does employ the
FEMA ICS structure, there were very few people present that were familiar with the ICS structure
at the time of the initial phase). This very quickly overwhelmed the Unified Command’s capacity
to receive, process, and transmit information without having the agencies wait. As the incident
was still unfolding, decisions about evacuations, public warning, and rescue priorities were
needed. This had a significant impact on the response.
As the incident moved from the initial into the stabilization phase (after the first 12-16 hours), the
Unified Command added an incident management specialist from the Michigan Department of
Energy, Great Lakes, and Environment (EGLE) to assist with the response. Additionally, recognizing
the structure was unmanageable, a more formal ICS structure was setup (Figure 48). Section
Chiefs were selected to serve as contact points in order to group agencies together. This reduced
the critical interactions the Unified Commanders were required to maintain and the delay
agencies were experiencing under the initial response structure.
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Figure 47: Initial Phase Organizational Structure
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Figure 48: Stabilization Phase Organizational Structure
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The stabilization phase response structure was organized at the county level with each
jurisdiction, responding agency, and infrastructure company taking part in twice daily update
meetings. These meetings covered:
Morning Briefing
•
•
•
•
•
•

Status changes overnight
Objectives for the day
Requests for resources
Questions for other agencies
Time for one-on-one coordination with other agencies
Public Information messages to release

Afternoon Planning Meeting
•
•
•
•

Review of accomplishments from the day
Discussion on plans for overnight
Discussion of issues of concern that came up during the day
Changes in resource status

Despite the significant damage to road infrastructure, damage to other infrastructure systems
was light. Few power outages were reported in populated areas, some residents lost natural gas
service when their road washed out, but again, these outages were very localized. There were no
communication outages and cell phone towers were not overwhelmed. The public safety radio
system (Michigan Public Safety Communication System (MPSCS)) was heavily loaded in the early
hours of the response but not beyond the first 5-8 hours and the system remained usable.
4.2.3.2 Interactions
The interactions in the 2018 flood response are listed below for both the initial response phase
and the stabilization phase of the incident.
4.2.3.2.1 Initial Phase Interactions:
Unified Command with:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

State of Michigan - Emergency Management and Homeland Security Division of the
Michigan State Police (EMHSD)
Michigan Technological University
Houghton County Road Commission
Local hospitals (2)
Long-term Care facilities (3 involved)
Mercy EMS (ambulance service)
Negaunee Regional Communications Center
Michigan Department of Transportation
Fire Service (via one liaison)
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•
•
•
•
•

Law Enforcement (via Houghton County Sheriff and Michigan State Police Post
Commander)
Houghton County Building Inspector
Houghton County Drain Commissioner
Houghton County Mine Inspector
Houghton County Board of Commissioners Chairman (Chief Elected Official)

Law Enforcement Liaison (Houghton County Sheriff) with:
•
•
•
•
•

Keweenaw County Sheriff’s Office
Michigan State Police
Houghton City Police
Hancock City Police
Michigan Tech Public Safety and Police Services

Fire Service Liaison (Bootjack Fire Chief) with:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Stanton Township Fire and First Responders
Houghton City Fire
Hancock City Fire
Ripley Fire
Quincy-Franklin-Hancock Township Fire
Hubbell Fire
Tamarack City Fire
Chassell Township Fire
Hurontown Fire and Rescue
Lake Linden Fire
Laurium Village Fire

4.2.3.2.2 Stabilization Phase Interactions:
Unified Command with:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

State of Michigan - Emergency Management and Homeland Security Division of the
Michigan State Police (EMHSD)
Michigan Technological University
Michigan Department of Natural Resources
Volunteer Resource Center
Operations Section Chief
Logistics Section Chief
Public Health Officer
Negaunee Regional Communications Center
Local non-profit foundations
Houghton County Board of Commissioners Chairman (Chief Elected Official)
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EMHSD District Coordinator with:
•
•
•

State Emergency Operations Center
FEMA
Stage Damage Assessment Support Team

Public Information Officer with:
•
•

Local media (radio, print, TV)
State and Federal Elected Officials

Operations Section Chief with:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Houghton County Road Commission
Michigan Department of Transportation
National Guard
City of Houghton Public Works
City of Hancock Public Works
Mercy EMS (ambulance service)
Fire Service (via one liaison)
Law Enforcement (via Houghton County Sheriff and Michigan State Police Post
Commander)
Upper Peninsula Power Company
SEMCO Energy (natural gas supplier)
Michigan Department of Energy, Great Lakes and Environment (EGLE) Team Stream
assessment team who coordinated with:
o Houghton County Drain Commissioner
o Houghton County Mine Inspector

Logistics Section Chief with:
•
•
•

Debris management agencies (Waste Management, Houghton County, State of Michigan
Department of Corrections)
Damage Assessment Group leader
Donations Management Group Leader

Public Health Chief with:
•
•

Western UP Health Department (environmental health)
Houghton County Building Inspector

Houghton County Board of Commissioners Chairman (Chief Elected Official) with:
•

Township, village, city officials

Law Enforcement Liaison (Houghton County Sheriff) with:
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•
•
•
•
•

Keweenaw County Sheriff’s Office
Michigan State Police
Houghton City Police
Hancock City Police
Michigan Tech Public Safety and Police Services

Fire Service Liaison (Bootjack Fire Chief) with:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Stanton Township Fire and First Responders
Houghton City Fire
Hancock City Fire
Ripley Fire
Quincy-Franklin-Hancock Township Fire
Hubbell Fire
Tamarack City Fire
Chassell Township Fire
Hurontown Fire and Rescue
Lake Linden Fire
Laurium Village Fire

4.2.3.3 Areas of Disequilibrium
Disequilibrium was present in the 2018 flood in many places. Disequilibrium is the difference
between the expected or normal value and the actual value. In this flooding incident, the incident
itself was a disequilibrium for the normal or expected. While flash flooding and urban flooding
was present in the Houghton County Hazard Mitigation Plan (Western Upper Peninsula Planning
and Development Region 2020), significant infrastructure damage due to flooding was not and no
recent exercises had been conducted with significant road outages.
Information flow disequilibrium:
•

•

Phone and text reports: During the initial phase of the response, too many agencies were
reporting to the Unified Commanders. At the emergency operations center, phone and
text messages were overloading the phones. The Emergency Management Coordinator
and the Sheriff were on two phones at a time with several calls holding while additional
calls were coming in. This continued for the first 4 hours of the incident (approximately
4:30 AM-8:30 AM). The result of this backlog was that agencies that needed decisions to
be made were unable to get answers in a timely manner and had to act on their own. It
also reduced the situational awareness of the Unified Commanders and they did not have
sufficient time to share the information from calls they had received with each other.
Evacuation: In particular, a decision about evacuating a long-term care facility of residents
was needed. A concern about a potential earthen dam breaching and causing a mudslide
in the community of Hubbell resulted in a discussion between the Emergency
Management Coordinator, the Hubbell Fire Chief, Mercy EMS President, and the longterm care facility manager about evacuating the residents of the facility. The overload of
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•

•

•

information and the lack of ability to make calls out of the Emergency Operation Center
(due to the significant number in incoming calls) could have significantly impacted this
critical operation.
Damage reports: Receiving damage reports (road outages in particular) was critical to the
response. Road outages not only impede the general public but impact the ability to get
emergency vehicles to areas in need. During the initial stages of the flood, several
communities were completely cutoff from outside support due to road outages. Reports
of outages were made to the Emergency Operations Center and a list was compiled. But
with no GIS support available and Houghton County’s reliance on a free version Google
Suite with limited map sharing options, setting up a common shared map that could be
easily relayed to agencies and the public took more than 8 hours. During the remainder
of the initial and stabilization phases of the incident, only a list of road closures was
actively maintained with the locations looked up on an online map as needed.
Local Amateur Radio Emergency Service (ARES): According to the Emergency Operation
Plan, during an emergency, local amateur radio operators can be called to assist with
information gathering. Local Amateur Radio Emergency Service (ARES) members were
asked to setup a radio communications network (net) to take damage reports from their
members scattered around the county. This net was maintained for the first 14 hours of
the incident but only received 4 reports.
Damage assessment: FEMA requires a preliminary damage assessment within 72 hours of
the incident stabilizing. For this task, fire fighters, search and rescue members and
emergency management coordinators from other counties volunteered to go door to
door across the affected areas of the county. By this time, staff from the Emergency
Management and Homeland Security Division of the Michigan State Police (EMHSD) had
arrived with a damage assessment system using GIS and iPads. Each team was quickly
trained and send out on assignments to cover the affected areas taking pictures, rating
damage (FEMA uses a 1-5 scale) and recording the results. Unfortunately, the first day of
damage assessment was poorly organized with some areas being missed, other areas
being covered twice, and additional areas not consistently assessed. Starting the second
day, a damage assessment group coordinator was chosen (who was also not one of the
Unified Commanders) and designed the team assignments, reiterated the objective and
methods to use, and was able to correct the errors of the first day.

Logistics
•

Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and County Offices: The Houghton County
Emergency Operation Center was located approximately 15 miles north of the county
offices. Due to road outages, it was decided to setup an alternative EOC at the
Sheriff’s Office. According to the county plan, the alternate EOC was located in the
basement of the courthouse, however, that space was flooded with 8 inches of water
during the early parts of the incident. Incidentally, that space also included the office
(including the computer, hard copy Emergency Operation Plans, etc. of the
Emergency Management Coordinator). The county plans did not account for both the
primary and alternate EOC’s to be inaccessible in a wide-scale emergency. The result
was an ad hoc EOC with the equipment the Sheriff’s Office and other responders had
from home.
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•

Donations: there was an outpouring of donations from around the country as news
of the flood spread including semi-truck loads of paper products from Kimberly Clark,
power tools from Milwaukee Tool, trash pumps from the Eagle Mine in Marquette,
barbecue meals from Arkansas, truckloads of bottled water, and many other items.
The local emergency plan was not setup to accommodate the large volume of
donations and there was not a significant number of community members requesting
items. This posed a significant challenge for accepting, inventorying, and then
distributing these donations. At the end of the incident, donations management was
the most time-consuming component of the response for the Incident Command
Team.

4.2.3.4 Measurement of Complexity
The measurement of complexity is, as mentioned previously in this dissertation, based on
perspective. For this analysis, the perspective is from the Unified Command as they were
organizing the response (Table 4). The circular representation (Figure 49) shows the interactions
of the Unified Command, agencies, and responders during the initial phase. In the initial phase,
the overlap in the inner (agency) circles indicates disequilibrium- where the Unified Command
could not accommodate the agencies fast enough to eliminate delay. In contrast, Figure 50 shows
that there are only two points of interaction (the scheduled meetings) and all agencies overlay
each other on the inner circle.

Figure 49: Unified Command-Agency Interactions during the initial phase of the 2018 flood. Note
the overlap of the inner circles indicates disequilibrium.
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Figure 50: Unified Command-Agency Interactions during the stabilization phase of the 2018
flood response.
Table 4: Complexity by operational period
Operational Period

Total ICS
Interactions

Interactions with
Unified Command

Complexity Measure

1 (initial)

42

19

19

2 (Stabilization)

60

10

10

4.2.3.5 Driving Interactions
There was no single driving interaction in this incident, but rather there was a set of interactions
that when removed, significantly reduced the disequilibrium and increased the efficiency of the
response. Reducing the number of direct reports to the Unified Command and assigning Section
Chiefs (specifically Operation, Logistics, and Public Health) removed the backlog of messages and
allowed the Unified Command to move from a reactionary operation to a planning and proactive
operational stance. Table 4 shows the complexity of the initial and stabilization phases of the
incident.
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4.2.3.6 Summary
Recognizing the need to reduce the information flow failures during the initial phase of the
incident, the Unified Command began creating Section Chiefs to reduce the number of
interactions the Unified Command needed to have. While the total number of interactions in the
system actually increased, the interactions with the Unified Command decreased, reducing the
complexity. This is shown by the smaller disequilibrium by reducing the delay in the information
flow. The second thing the Unified Command did was to request updates only twice a day. By
requesting updates only at these times, that effectively consolidated the interactions together
into two larger (longer) interactions.
By examining the number and nature of the interactions, the complexity was examined and
reduced for the Unified Command. Like the previous case, this incident demonstrates that
measuring complexity by the number of interactions from a given symmetry (perspective). This is
also a decrease in disequilibrium for the system. The idea of having fewer direct reports is also
reinforced by FEMA who recommends that a single supervisor oversees no more than 5-7 people
(Federal Emergency Management Agency 2018c) and is supported by the research of Miller
(1956), mentioned earlier in this dissertation.
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5 Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1 Conclusions
The objective of this research was to determine a measure of complexity and system
characteristics that indicate likely points of information flow failure in project management. Using
methods to visualize the number and nature of component interactions, the disequilibrium can
be detected, and the critical interactions identified. Identifying these critical interactions allows
the project manager to reduce the number of interactions for the desired symmetry, decreasing
the complexity, and the potential for disequilibrium leading to a reduction in information flow
failures. As demonstrated in the case studies, not all interactions can be reduced without
information loss. Further, reducing the complexity for a particular perspective or symmetry, may
increase complexity for other areas of the system.
The information flow failures that negatively impact the efficiency of a project or response are
points of disequilibrium that occur at interactions between two components of a system. As the
number of component intersections increase, the degrees of freedom increase, which increases
the number of points that can be in disequilibrium. Therefore, by reducing the number of
interactions (reducing the complexity), the opportunities for disequilibrium are reduced.
This research also has discussed project scaling and the application of the measure of complexity.
As project systems scale, the measure of complexity continues to apply. Larger systems, as shown
in the case studies, have a greater number of components and interactions. But this alone does
not indicate higher complexity. The complexity is based on the symmetry; therefore, overall
system interactions may increase, but the interactions given a chosen symmetry may be lower –
leading to a lower measure of complexity. It is interesting to note that this conclusion of the
research (limiting the number of interactions to reduce complexity, and therefore information
flow failures) mirrors the guidance from FEMA regarding span of control, or the maximum number
of people or groups a supervisor can effectively manage. FEMA’s guidance states supervising more
than 5 people can lead to communication failures. This dissertation does not specify a maximum
number of interactions before failure, but this is an area for future work.
Also of note are the connections between this research and the Kalman minimal realization of
these systems. Since signals may not be directly observable (recall that projects do not necessarily
give off signals), the ability to determine if an interaction is in disequilibrium indirectly would be
helpful. For example, in an emergency that is taking place over a large geographic area, the cycle
times for search teams in a remote area may not be measurable from the command post. But,
based on the remote staging area’s manager, and other search teams operating at that location,
the state of a particular team could be estimated.

5.2 Limitations
The research in this dissertation has made some assumptions and has limitations in its application.
However, these limitations do not change the overarching measure of complexity as a function of
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the number and nature of interactions for a system. Moreover, the methods used to analyze and
visualize the disequilibrium in a system may not all apply to all types of systems as effectively.
First, this research assumes that there is data available such as cycle times of components, the
organization, or relationship between components of a project or emergency response. It also
assumes that there is time for processing that data, even at a basic level during the project or
incident.
Second, the images in this dissertation, use the assumption that cycle times are constant for all of
a particular type of component (search team for example). This is not necessarily the case as these
cycle times may vary. However, that does not change the underlying concept that the circle
circumference represents the cycle time of the component.
Third, it is important to recognize that the analysis in the case studies represents snapshots in
time of those projects. As the projects scale up and down, the system changes and the measure
of complexity can change as well.

5.3 Contributions
This research contributes to the body of knowledge by providing quantitative methods for
measuring system complexity. The measurement can be used in planning and analyzing projects
or incidents. Practitioners in project and emergency management can use the knowledge of the
number and nature of interactions in their systems to reduce the potential for information flow
failures. Project and emergency managers can build into their plans, a time for reflection on
project information flow failures and examine what driving interactions are causing that
disequilibrium. Not all aspects of each project can be measured or planned, but knowledge of the
concept that fewer interactions reduces the potential for disequilibrium in a system, which
reduces the opportunities of information flow failures, can help managers improve their projects.
With information flow failures being nearly universally cited in emergency response and exercise
After-Action Reports as a cause of inefficiency, this research can help bridge that shortcoming.

5.4 Recommendations for future work
There are several areas of related research that were beyond the scope of this project but would
further the goal of improving efficiency in project management:
•

•

A discussion of the behavior of agents (components) that is unplanned and emergent
behavior would be beneficial. This research assumed that the components or resources
followed instructions and assignments. However, in real projects, resources may (will)
improvise or simply ignore instructions and assignments if they choose. One question to
address is: If the disequilibrium reaches a critical point, and the agent decides not to wait,
what will that agent do and how does that impact the complexity of the system when
agents create new interactions? This direction would likely be a fruitful collaboration with
research in behavioral science.
The impact of exercises and training on disequilibrium should be explored. FEMA requires
responders and emergency management coordinators to meet annual exercise and
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•

•

training requirements for grant program compliance (the Emergency Management
Performance Grant for example). Data on how effective this requirement is in reducing
disequilibrium would be valuable and could inform this often expensive and very timeconsuming requirement in the future.
Additional research into the geographic realm of complexity and disequilibrium should be
made. Already the author is conducting research into the differences in lost person
behavior using different methods such as least cost path in comparison to a Bayesian
method. This research would look at the differences in disequilibrium while potentially
holding the number of interactions constant (i.e., same resources available, different
search methods).
While discussed briefly in this dissertation, examining disequilibrium through the lens of
network stability, resilience, and robustness of complex infrastructure networks, is an
area of research that could be explored further. The relationship between
interdependent infrastructure components and the component interactions could be
similar to the work conducted in this dissertation. Fundamentally, this would try to
answer the question similar to one asked above: How much disequilibrium can a system
handle before it breaks?

These additional areas of future research would continue this work and further develop use cases
for the metric of complexity developed in this dissertation.
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A

Appendix: Additional Plots of Varying Frequency
and Delay

The plots in this appendix continue the experiments described in Chapter 3. The first two plots
(Figure 51 and Figure 52) show varying frequencies. The third and fourth plots (Figure 53 and
Figure 54) show the results of varying the delay on the second component (the excavator). The
frequency of the truck cycle remains constant (at 1CPT) and the frequency of the excavator also
remains constant at 12CPT. However, the delay (wait time) for the excavator is varied from time=
0 units to time= 0.1 units. The third set of plots (Figure 55 and Figure 56) show the results of
varying both frequency and delay.
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Figure 51: Varying the frequency and comparing the summation waveform, FFT magnitude, and
phase calculations shows that each FFT magnitude plot has the frequency components clearly
visible as spikes on the normalized magnitude plot. The phase angle of each component is
plotted as well as comparison to the base case (left side).
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Figure 52: Continuation of figure 48: Varying the frequency and comparing the summation
waveform, FFT magnitude, and phase calculations shows that each FFT magnitude plot has the
frequency components clearly visible as spikes on the normalized magnitude plot.
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Figure 53: Plots of varying delay while holding the frequencies constant. The plots on the left are
with no delay (balanced system). The plots on the right are with a delay of ε=0.025. The phase
angle difference plot on the bottom is the difference in phase angle from the control (plot with
ε=0) and this iteration (plot with ε=0.025).
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Figure 54: Continuation from figure A-3. Continuing to increase the delay while holding the
frequencies constant. The plots on the left are with a delay of ε=0.05. The plots on the right are
with a delay of ε=0.1. The FFT in plot (3,2) shows that the delay in the excavator plot is growing
large enough that it effectively acts as another frequency in the system.
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Figure 55: Varying both the frequency and delay and comparing the result to the baseline with
two frequencies and no delay.
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Figure 56: Continuation of figure 54. Varying both the frequency and delay and comparing the
result to the baseline with two frequencies and no delay.
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Figure 43: “6-Hour Precipitation”. Source: National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration. Provided by: National Weather Service, July 2018.
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